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Learning about relationships in
the environment.
cognition The use and handling of
knowledge.
episodic memory In humans the consciously recol-
lected memory for facts and events
as they are characterized by their
contents (what), their time of occur-
rence (when), and their locations
(where). Episodic-like memory in
animals stores the what, when,
and where for important events
(food). (See Section 1.26.6.)
explicit knowledge Knowledge encoded as represen-
tations, such as places, facts, and
events.
habituation Reduction of responsiveness after
multiple application of the same
stimulus. Habituation is discrimi-
nated from sensory adaptation and
motor fatigue by its stimulus speci-
ficity, spontaneous recovery,
dishabituation by a strong stimu-
lus, and by a saving effect (stronger
response decrement after multiple
sessions of habituation).
implicit knowledge Knowledge encoded in actions









Associative forms of learning in
which individual events are
ambiguous and only logical com-
binations of them can be used to
solve the problem. Examples are
described in Section 1.26.4.
occasion setting A learning situation in which a sti-
mulus, the occasion setter, sets the
occasion for when a predictive
relationship applies. Contextual
learning is closely related to occa-
sion setting (see Section 1.26.5.3).
operant
conditioning
Learning about the consequences
of one’s own behavior.
phylogenetic
memory
The species’ memory. The infor-
mation stored in the genome as
acquired by mutation and selec-
tion during evolution.
predictive learning Using operant and classical con-
ditioning to predict future events.
rule learning The ability of an animal to infer
rule information from a number
of different examples connected
by a common feature (see
Section 1.26.5).
search image Animals searching for a target the
knowledge about which has
either been learned or is known
on the basis of innate information
(phylogenetic memory).
sensitization Increase of responsiveness after the
experience of a strong stimulus.
working memory A transient form of active memory
that combines both information
retrieved from a permanent store
and actual incoming information
(see Sections 1.26.6.1 and
1.26.6.2)
1.26.1 Introduction
Animals are characterized at all levels of neural com-
plexity by a continuous flow of energy, material, and
information. Behavior is an animal’s means for sur-
viving the destructive forces of entropy on both long
and short timescales. Evolution maintains and in most
cases improves complexity over multiple reproductive
life cycles. To achieve this goal the environment eval-
uates stochastic changes in the material inheriting the
organism’s organizational information, and the infor-
mation thus selected is transmitted from one
generation to the next. Thus, evolution is in essence
an information-creating (in some cases information-
destructing) process, and the inherited information
characterizing each organism may be called the spe-
cies-specific phylogenetic memory.
Animals also collect and store individual mem-
ories on a short timescale through learning by
experience. Information based on repeated experi-
ence gathered by an individual organism in attempts
to cope with the immediate demands of the environ-
ment is evaluated through environmental feedback,
either reinforcing or reducing the impact of the
underlying cellular mechanisms on the organism’s
future responses. Individual memory is therefore
based on learning, which is the capacity to modify
the individual’s behavior on a relatively permanent
basis through the acquisition of new information
based on individual experience. Both kinds of mem-
ory, phylogenetic and individual memory, can be
understood as organismic devices to predict the
future and to reduce the environment’s uncertainty.
They are thus instantiations that link the past with
the future, creating a present that is better adapted
to the organism’s requirements. Individual memory
is incorporated into the framework provided by the
phylogenetic memory, facilitating and shaping indi-
vidual learning processes. Thus, the framework
within which experience-based learning occurs is
tuned to the demands expected during the individual
organism’s lifetime.
Cognition can be viewed as the integrating process
that utilizes both forms of memory, creates an inter-
nal representation of the world and a basis for
expecting the future of the animal’s own actions
within the experienced environment. It thus allows
the animal to decide between different options in
reference to the expected outcome of its potential
actions. All these processes occur as intrinsic proper-
ties of the nervous system and provide an implicit
form of knowledge for controlling behavior. None
of these processes need to – and certainly will not –
become explicit within the nervous systems of most
invertebrates, but, as this review will show, such pro-
cesses must be assumed to also exist in invertebrates
with proper nervous systems (albeit over a large range
of levels of complexity) to account for their behavior.
The results of these integrating cognitive processes
are manifold and can span a gradient of possibilities.
In such a gradient, at one extreme, one can find
organisms dominated by their inherited information
and having minimal experience-based adaptation; at
the other extreme, phylogenetic memory may merely
provide a broad framework, and experience-based
memory will dominate. The factors determining the
specific combination and weights of inherited and
experience-dependent memories in an individual are
not yet well understood. A short individual lifetime,
few environmental changes during a lifetime, and
highly specialized living conditions will favor the
dominance of inherited information; a longer indivi-
dual lifetime, less adaptation to particular
environmental niches, and rapid environmental
changes relative to the life span reduce the impact of
phylogenetic memory and increase the role of indivi-
dual learning. Social living style also seems to be a
defining factor for the balance between these different
forms of memory. In social animals, learning has to
play an important role, because the species’ genome
must equip the individuals for acting under much
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more variable environmental conditions because of
the society’s longer lifetime, and because the commu-
nicative processes within the society demand a larger
range of cognitive processes.
It has also been suspected that the complexity and
size of the nervous system may be related to the
dominance of inherited or experience-dependent
memories, in the sense that individual learning
demands a larger nervous system having greater com-
plexity. However, the primary parameter determining
the size of the nervous system is body size, and sec-
ondary parameters such as richness of the sensory
world, cognitive capacities, and abundance of motor
patterns are difficult to relate to brain size, because
such parameters cannot be adequately measured, and
thus a comparison based on them is practically impos-
sible between animals adapted to different
environments. Although the relationship between
brain size and cognitive capacity is still unclear, it is
obvious that animals differ with respect to their sen-
sory, motor, and cognitive capacities (see Evolution of
the Elephant Brain: A Paradox between Brain Size
and Cognitive Behavior). Individual learning within
the species-specific sensory and motor domains will
lead to more flexible behavior, and thus to more
advanced cognitive functions. Predicting the future
will therefore be less constrained, and more options
will enrich the animal’s present state.
Although we do not attempt to strictly define the
cognitive components of behavior, the essential
characteristics of cognition are: (1) rich and cross-
linked forms of sensory and motor processing;
(2) flexibility and experience-dependent plasticity in
choice performance; and (3) long-term (on the time-
scale of the respective animal’s life span) adaptation
of behavioral routines. These three features allow the
creation of novel behavior through different forms of
learning and memory processing. Among them, we
can cite (1) rule learning, (2) observatory learning
during navigation and imitation, and (3) recognition
of group members and individuals in a society. All
these characteristics are based on implicit forms of
knowledge and do not require any explicit (or con-
scious) processing. However, internal processing at
the level of working memory (or representation) as
an indication of rudimentary forms of explicit proces-
sing may exist in invertebrates within the context of
observatory learning and social communication, and
will be discussed.
We shall first consider forms of behavior that are
dominated by innate components, and raise the
questions of how innate and learned behavior are
related and whether innate behavior involves cogni-
tive components. The following sections focus on
experience-dependent forms of behavior and follow
in the order of ascending complexity: from elemen-
tal forms of associative learning to rule learning and
observatory learning in navigation and communica-
tion. A key component in cognition is memory, not
only as a storing device, but also in the form of
working memory, the implicit form of representa-
tion which may provide the substrate for neural
operations underlying decision making in relation
to the expected outcome of the animal’s actions.
Both aspects of memory will be discussed.
1.26.2 Dominance of Innate Behavior
Invertebrates are dominated to a great extent by
innate behavior, and some researchers have gone
so far as to characterize insects and crustacea as
‘‘mindless machines’’ (Gould and Gould, 1982).
Historically, innate preferences for biologically rele-
vant sensory cues were used to characterize innate
behavior. This view, which is still represented in
ecological approaches to invertebrate behavior,
assumes that invertebrates are irresistibly attracted
to some sensory cues, which act as magnets on
different phases of invertebrate behavior. At the
origin of this notion, one can certainly find the pre-
conception that invertebrates are essentially reflex
machines with limited forms of experience-dependent
plasticity. Although we shall focus on learning-
related flexibility as a characteristic of invertebrate
cognition, it is worthwhile to first recognize the
complexity and richness of innate sensory–motor
routines and their relationship to learned behavior.
1.26.2.1 Selection of Habitat, Feeding, and
Foraging
Earthworms not only eat their way through the soil,
swallowing the dirt they encounter, but feed selec-
tively in many ways, as described by Darwin (1882).
They leave unsuitable ground and select more pro-
ductive soil, and they crawl out of their burrows at
night to feed on the leaves of certain plant species.
The earthworm grasps the tapered tip opposite the
petiole, and then pulls the leaf back into the burrow
to be eaten underground (Edwards and Lofty,
1972). Selection of habitat and food sources is com-
monly based on ‘search images’, innate sensory–
neural filters that inform the animal about the
desired food. Innate preferences are difficult to
demonstrate because they require an absolute con-
trol of the animal’s experience prior to the
experiments in which it is confronted with the sti-
muli to be tested. If such control is absent, it is
practically impossible to conclude anything about
potential innate preferences, because the animal’s
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choice may simply reflect its previous experience
with natural stimuli in its environment. Despite the
difficulty of achieving such a control, some studies
have appropriately addressed the question of innate
preferences and showed that such preferences do
indeed exist. However, they have also pointed out
that choice behavior driven by this programmed
signal responding is subjected to dramatic modifica-
tions based on first experiences. Thus, although
such preferences may exist, they seem to be essen-
tially useful in guiding the animals’ behavior in their
first confrontations with the external world.
A clear example of changes in innate prefer-
ences due to previous experiences is provided by
the cuttlefish Sepia officinalis. In this animal,
Darmaillacq et al. (2004a) recently showed that
on the third day post-eclosion, when the young
cuttlefish have consumed their vitellogenic
resources, they exhibit clear preference for
shrimps over crabs and young fish of comparable
sizes. However, by making the preferred prey dis-
tasteful with quinine, it is possible to induce a
preference for an originally nonpreferred prey
item in 3-day-old and naı¨ve cuttlefish, demonstrat-
ing the flexibility of this initial behavioral
preference in response to previous individual
experience. Such a learning is extremely fast
(Darmaillacq et al., 2004b), a fact that indicates
to what extent innate preferences may be easily
modified.
In insects, several studies have addressed the ques-
tion of appetitive choice behavior as driven by
innate preferences. In the moth Helicoverpa armi-
gera, for instance, Cunningham et al. (2004) have
shown that experience-deprived adult moths raised
in isolation exhibit innate preferences for phenyl-
acetaldehyde when tested in dual-choice wind tunnel
tests. Again, this preference changes rapidly if a
nonpreferred volatile substance is paired with a
feeding stimulus (sucrose solution). In honeybees,
a similar result was found with respect to color
preferences. Honeybees whose visual experience
was strictly controlled in a flight cage in which no
rewards were provided on colored targets showed
consistent preferences for some dominant wave-
lengths when presented with such targets in their
first active foraging flight (Giurfa et al., 1995).
Colors preferred by naı¨ve bees were human-blue
and human-yellow, which correspond to those
hues that experienced bees learn faster and better
when trained with a single color/sucrose reward
association (Menzel, 1967). However, all other
hues which are originally not chosen rapidly
become preferred if they are explicitly paired with
sucrose reward (Giurfa et al., 1995).
The intimate connection between innate and
learned behaviors and their mutual replacement
for behavioral control also becomes obvious in
host selection by the two species of the stem-borer
parasitoids Cotesia glomerata and Cotesia flavipes
(Hymenoptera, Braconidae) (Geervliet et al., 1998;
Potting et al., 1997; Vet, 1996; Vet et al., 1995).
While C. flavipes exhibits innate preference for its
host’s odors, the larvae of Pieris brassica
(Lepidoptera), the closely related C. glomerata,
learns the varying odor profiles of its Pieris host
larvae, which depend on the plants it feeds on. No
other differences in behavior between these two
species were found, indicating that experience-
dependent adjustment and innate stereotypy are
two close strategies and are not related to any
great differences between the neural systems
involved.
The interesting question of whether innate prefer-
ences are deleted or inhibited by experience (and
thus available at different moments of an inverte-
brate’s life) has been addressed in bumblebees
(Gumbert, 2000). Naı¨ve bumblebees show color
preferences that are similar to those exhibited by
honeybees. After being trained to a given colored
target by pairing it with sucrose reward, the bees
chose novel test colors according to their similarity
to the trained color. Thus, bees generalized their
choice from the trained to novel, similar colors;
however, if the trained and the test colors were
perceptually dissimilar to the bees such that general-
ization did not occur, the original innate color
preferences reappeared and guided the bees’ choices.
Thus, bumblebees show innate preferences for cer-
tain colors not only prior to color learning but also
after intensive learning when choosing among very
different novel colors (Gumbert, 2000).
These chosen examples among many similar
ones from other invertebrates allow us to con-
clude that (1) invertebrates exhibit innate
preferences for signals allowing to rapidly and
efficiently detect biologically relevant stimuli in
their first encounters with them; (2) such prefer-
ences can be drastically modified by the animals’
experience such that plasticity and not rigidity of
behavior should be underlined in the case of
innate preferences; and (3) such preferences can
be available in experienced adults such that they
can be retrieved under particular circumstances,
when the learned information is no longer useful.
It is still unknown how these preferences can be
hard-wired in the naı¨ve invertebrate nervous sys-
tem, but they have been selected through the
species’ evolutionary history and thus belong to
its phylogenetic memory.
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1.26.2.2 Early Programmed Learning
Early programmed learning occurs in young animals
exposed to particular stimuli during a critical per-
iod. As a consequence of this process, also called
imprinting, the animal later prefers the ‘imprinted’
stimuli. This kind of programmed learning has also
been documented in invertebrates, particularly in
insects. For instance, mosquitoes Culex quinquefas-
ciatus use chemical cues to locate suitable water
pools for oviposition. An individual mosquito’s pre-
ferences for these odors can be altered greatly by
prior experience (McCall and Eaton, 2001). In par-
ticular, change in odor preferences could be
demonstrated following exposure to the odor during
development or pupal eclosion, suggesting that
some form of larval or early adult imprinting
occurred.
In social Hymenoptera, parental relationships
involve the use of specific signals, some emitted by
the young animals, and others by the adults. Some
of the signals are learned during an early experience
(Dobson, 1989). The behavioral responses of para-
sitic wasps to chemical cues from their hosts and
host plants are known to be affected by genetic and
environmental components. Gandolfi et al. (2003)
have shown that true pre-imaginal learning of olfac-
tory cues occurs in the parasitic wasp Hyssopus
pallidus. While parasitoids are not able to learn the
fruit cues in the adult stage, exposure to fruit odor at
early pre-imaginal stages significantly increases the
adult response to frass from fruit-fed caterpillars
(Gandolfi et al., 2003). The olfactory memory per-
sisted through metamorphosis, with a retention time
of 14 days. Pre-imaginal learning was not confined
to fruit cues, but was also demonstrated for
menthol, an olfactory host- and fruit-independent
cue.
A fascinating case of imprinting in insects is pro-
vided by studies on slave-making ants, which are
characterized by socially parasitic founding of colo-
nies (i.e., colonies in which two species of social
insects coexist, one of which is parasitically depen-
dent on the other) and the pillage of broods from
neighboring host colonies during slave raids. Slave-
making ants invade colonies of other ant species and
transport the pupae back to their own nest. Adults
emerging from these pupae react and work for the
slave-making species as if it were its own species
(Isingrini et al., 1985; Carlin and Schwartz, 1989).
The basis for such phenomenon may be olfactory
imprinting processes by which the slave ants learn to
recognize the slave makers as members of their own
species. This hypothesis is subject to debate because
it has been argued, for instance, that the capacity of
larvae to imprint on the odor of their natal nest
might make an ant species unsuitable for slave
makers. An ant worker pillaged as pupa after pre-
imaginal imprinting might identify slave-maker
brood as alien and refuse to care for them
(D’Ettorre and Heinze, 2001). However, the pro-
blem is solved if the hydrocarbon cuticular
profiles, the distinctive olfactory mark of each spe-
cies, of both the slaves and the slave makers are
similar. This seems to indeed be the case (Lenoir
et al., 2001; D’Ettorre et al., 2002).
The mechanistic basis of early olfactory learning
has been studied in some insects. In the fruit fly
Drosophila melanogaster, Devaud et al. (2003)
showed that synaptogenesis in the antennal lobe,
the primary olfactory neuropile in the insect brain,
starts in late pupa and continues during the first
days of adult life, at the same time as the behavioral
response to odors matures. The antennal lobe is
made up of functional units with a globular struc-
ture called the glomeruli, which can be recurrently
identified due to their position and morphology.
Individual olfactory glomeruli (DM6, DM2, and
V) in Drosophila display specific growth patterns
between days 1 and 12 of adult life. Experience can
modify the olfactory pathway both structurally and
functionally, as shown by adaptation experiments.
The modifications associated with this form of
learning seem to take place at a critical age.
Exposure to benzaldehyde at days 2–5 of adult life,
but not at 8–11, causes behavioral adaptation as
well as structural changes in DM2 and V glomeruli.
Taken together, these data demonstrate an imprint-
ing-like phenomenon in the olfactory pathway of
young Drosophila adults, and illustrate its glomer-
ulus-specific dynamics.
1.26.3 Elemental Forms of Associative
Learning
Rapid changes in environmental contingencies
require flexible capacities with which organisms
can come to expect biologically significant events
and modify their behavior in anticipation of those
events if behavior is to remain adaptive; that is,
increase the probability of obtaining beneficial con-
sequences and avoiding harmful ones (Reif, 1998;
Sutton and Barto, 1998; Dickinson and Balleine,
2002). The acquisition of such anticipatory beha-
vior relies on simple associative principles.
These principles are centered on computing error
signals: whenever the current expectation is vio-
lated, error signals trigger processes in the brain
which serve to both keep the animal’s expectation
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up-to-date and minimize such errors. The most
potent error signals are generated by unexpected
situations or events with biological relevance (i.e.,
an unconditioned stimulus, US): upon first perceiv-
ing such an unexpected US, coincidence detectors
evaluate any neural activity preceding or overlap-
ping with the error signal generated by the US. A
priori it is irrelevant if this neural activity stems from
the animal’s behavior (abbreviated: BH) and/or from
any environmental stimulation (i.e., a conditioned
stimulus, CS). The preceding events can serve as
predictors of the US, if their temporal connection
with the US is consistent enough. Depending on the
state of the animal and the nature of the environ-
ment, several more encounters with the US and its
preceding events are required for a reliable memory
to form. A reliable memory means that fully
expected USs no longer generate any error signals,
and hence the animal does not need to update its
expectations any further. In such a state, the animal
can behave adaptively: it expects the consequences
of any behavior or situation.
There are two basic ways in which such memories
can be acquired. In operant (or instrumental) con-
ditioning the behavior (BH) of the animal is essential
for these memories to form; indeed, it is the predic-
tor by which the animal controls the occurrence of
the US. If, on the other hand, the animal’s behavior
is dispensable for learning to occur, the situation is
termed classical (or Pavlovian) conditioning. In
freely moving animals, these two systems work
together to guide adaptive behavior; Pavlovian
learning often provides information to guide the
selection of a particular behavioral strategy. But
these systems can also work independently and
even in opposition to one another (Ellison and
Konorski, 1964; Balleine, 2001).
1.26.3.1 Invertebrate Classical Conditioning
The main associative principle for the conceptual
understanding of classical conditioning is the notion
of stimulus substitution (Pavlov, 1927). In the naı¨ve
animal, the CS initially triggers no or little response,
that is, there is a transmission block from the sen-
sory pathway to the motor circuits. If this CS is
paired consistently enough with an initially unex-
pected US, the locations in the nervous system where
the sensory information about the two events con-
verge are modified such that the CS now comes to
elicit a behavioral response, often mimicking the
response to the US. The pairing has created new
connections or removed transmission blocks so
that the sensory circuitry processing the CS can
now access some of the response-producing motor
circuits that were previously engaged only by the
US. By acquiring some of the response-eliciting
properties of the US, the CS prepares the animal
for the US and minimizes the error signals that
future USs generate.
For instance, in Aplysia skin, sensory neurons
make direct synapses onto motor neurons that con-
trol the defensive gill withdrawal reflex. Upon a
light touch to the naı¨ve animal’s siphon, these sen-
sorimotor synapses fail to conduct and the gills are
not withdrawn. However, if the touch is repeatedly
paired with a noxious stimulus (such as an electric
shock) which does elicit gill withdrawal, the light
touch alone eventually comes to elicit a gill with-
drawal, whereas before such training it did not (see,
e.g., Kandel et al., 1979, 1983; Walters et al., 1979,
1981; Carew et al., 1981, 1983, 1984; Kandel
and Schwartz, 1982; Hawkins et al., 1983, 1986,
1989, 1998; Walters and Byrne, 1983a, 1983b;
Abrams and Kandel, 1988; Byrne et al., 1990).
This increase in synaptic efficacy (facilitation) is
brought about by the action of the neuromodulator
serotonin released by modulatory interneurons dur-
ing the electric shock. The sea slug Aplysia was most
helpful for identifying synaptic facilitation as an
instance of stimulus substitution and thus establish-
ing a neurobiological basis for a psychological
concept.
The discovery of such simple biological processes
was of tremendous importance for the study of clas-
sical conditioning in more complex invertebrate
brains such as those of insects. This can be exempli-
fied in olfactory learning. The similar structure of
the first few processing stages of smell in vertebrates
and invertebrates is intriguing. Sensory neurons
expressing the same olfactory receptor converge on
aggregates of glomerular neuropil structures, where
they synapse onto local interneurons and projecting
neurons. In both vertebrates and invertebrates the
pattern of neural activity in the glomeruli is odor
specific. In insects, the projection neurons transmit
this pattern to the next synapse in the calyces of the
mushroom bodies. Evidence from aversive condi-
tioning in Drosophila and from appetitive
conditioning in Apis points toward an initial CS
conduction failure either at the input synapse, or
the output synapse of the mushroom body Kenyon
cells, or suggests additive effects at both
(Heisenberg, 2003). In Drosophila, a group of ani-
mals is exposed to one of two initially equivalent
odors at a time in a vial coated with an electried grid
(e.g., Tully and Quinn, 1985; Tully, 1991; Tully
et al., 1994). One of the odors is paired with an
electric shock. After a few such odor–shock pair-
ings, the animals are exposed to each of the odors
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from opposing vials in a decision chamber and have
to make a choice between the odors. In a successful
conditioning experiment, the large majority of flies
will avoid the odor associated with the shock. In the
honeybee, individually harnessed hungry animals
initially rarely respond to an odor presentation
with an extension of their mouthparts (proboscis),
whereas they will almost invariably do so if a sugar
solution touches their antennas (e.g., Menzel, 1990;
Menzel and Mu¨ller, 1996). If the odor is paired with
the sucrose stimulation even only once, a stable
memory of this association is formed and the animal
will exhibit the conditioned proboscis extension
response (PER) to future presentations of the odor
alone. In both insects, the information about the
identity of the odors is relayed to the behavior-initi-
ating centers deep in the brain via the glomerular
olfactory lobes and the mushroom bodies. Neurons
containing the neuromodulators octopamine and
dopamine have been found which could modulate
any of the synapses in this pathway (Hammer, 1993,
1997; Schwaerzel et al., 2003). Interestingly for the
notion of expectation and anticipation, the octopami-
nergic neuron VUMmx1 exhibits activity paralleling
the animal’s expectation: it responds to unexpected
sucrose presentations, but not to expected ones
(Hammer, 1993, 1997). While there is evidence in
vertebrates of how this reduction in the error
signal may be implemented biologically, such evi-
dence is still lacking in invertebrates. Conditioning
using the PER has been so successful that it has
been established in other insects such as moths
and flies (Medioni and Vaysse, 1975; DeJianne
et al., 1985; Holliday and Hirsch, 1986; Brigui
et al., 1990; Fan et al., 1997; Fresquet, 1999;
Hartlieb et al., 1999; Daly and Smith, 2000; Fan
and Hansson, 2001; Skiri et al., 2005) and for use
with mechanosensory stimuli (Giurfa and Malun,
2004).
There is another advantageous snail model system
for predictive learning, the pond snail Lymnaea. Its
feeding behavior can be classically and its respira-
tory behavior operantly conditioned. Appetitive
classical conditioning of Lymnaea feeding behavior
involves either a tactile (touch to the lips) or a che-
mical (amylacetate) CS and a sucrose US (Kemenes
et al., 2002; Jones et al., 2003; Staras et al., 2003;
Straub et al., 2004; Fulton et al., 2005; Korneev
et al., 2005). A single presentation of either CS
with a sucrose solution will enhance Lymnaea’s
bititing frequency in the presence of future CSs pre-
sented without the sucrose. Changes in neuronal
activity and cellular properties that were recorded
following tactile conditioning occur at all levels of
the system, including central sensory pathways,
modulatory interneurons, central pattern generator
(CPG) interneurons, and motoneurons involving
several possible plasticity sites. Aplysia biting beha-
vior can be conditioned similarly (Lechner et al.,
2000a, 2000b). A brief touch to the lips with a
small brush (CS) does not usually elicit a bite. But
when this touch is consistently paired with a food
reward (US), the touch alone suffices to elicit the
bite. This procedure has been transferred to a
reduced preparation, where peripheral nerve stimu-
lation replaces the CS and US and motor nerve
recordings monitor the behavior (Mozzachiodi
et al., 2003).
A third molluskan model system, the predatory
snail Hermissenda, has revealed principal aspects of
classical conditioning. The conditioning procedure
consists of pairing light CS with high-speed rotation,
or orbital shaking (US) which are aversive stimuli
for the snail (Crow, 2004). Two responses are eli-
cited by rotation, a reduced rate of forward
locomotion and foot shortening. The two sensory
structures mediating the CS and US are central, and
thus their synaptic projections remain intact after
isolation of the nervous system. Because the neurons
that contribute to the neural circuitry controlling
the unconditioned responses (URs) and conditioned
responses (CRs) are identified, and can be studied in
semi-intact nervous systems, an explanation is
within reach of how conditioning is expressed in
behavior generation.
Recently, earthworms have also been classically
conditioned to anticipate potentially dangerous illumi-
nation after a brief vibration by longitudinally
contracting their body (Watanabe et al., 2005). Other
invertebrate model systems for classical conditioning
include cockroaches and crickets (Matsumoto and
Mizunami, 2002, 2004; Matsumoto et al., 2003;
Watanabe et al., 2003; Kwon et al., 2004; Lent and
Kwon, 2004; Pinter et al., 2005).
The notion of predictability and error signal mini-
mization developed mainly from classical
conditioning experiments. In the course of these
experiments, a number of paradigms were devel-
oped which now can be used to probe invertebrate
preparations for the biological substrate underlying
these learning phenomena. The first hint at predict-
ability at the chore of classical conditioning came
from its strict dependence on the relative timing of
CS and US. In order for classical conditioning to
occur, the onset of the CS has to occur before the
onset of the US. Simultaneous or reverse (backward)
pairings yield very little to no learning (Hellstern
et al., 1998). This result also contradicts the notion
that simple pairings were sufficient for conditioning
to occur. The next challenge to the simple pairing
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hypothesis was to randomly add US-alone presenta-
tions, so as to render the CS nonpredictive, but to
preserve the total number of paired CS–US presenta-
tions from successful experiments. Strengthening
the predictability hypothesis, a US that is presented
equally often with or without the CS prevents any
CS–US conditioning that would normally have
occurred (Rescorla, 1968). More sophisticated
experiments included a second CS. In sensory pre-
conditioning (Brogden, 1939; Kimmel, 1977), CS1
and CS2 are first presented together, without any
US. In a second training phase, one of them (CS1) is
paired with the US until the CS1–US association is
formed. In the test phase, CS2 is tested alone.
Successful sensory preconditioning experiments
also contradict the simple pairing hypothesis, since
CS2 was never paired with the US (Brembs and
Heisenberg, 2001; Guo and Guo, 2005; for the
honeybee, Mu¨ller et al., 2000). In blocking experi-
ments (Kamin, 1968), a first training phase consists
of CS1–US pairings. In the second training phase,
CS2 is added, so that the compound CS1–CS2 is
paired with the US. The idea behind this experiment
is that the prediction error signal for the US is zero
after the first training phase (CS1 fully predicts
every US occurrence) and as such nothing will be
learned about the ‘redundant’ CS2. Hence the term
‘blocking’: the learning about CS1 blocks any learn-
ing about CS2, even though it was paired with the
US sufficiently to produce classical conditioning had
the first training not occurred (see Brembs and
Heisenberg, 2001 for invertebrate literature on
blocking). In the honeybee, the data on blocking
are controversial (Smith and Cobey, 1994; Gerber
and Ullrich, 1999). It is yet to be resolved whether
the kind of odor stimulus (Linster and Smith, 1997)
or the adequate control group will help to determine
that blocking is a reliable phenomenon.
Perhaps not very surprisingly, all mechanisms
and changes found to subserve classical condition-
ing in any of the above-mentioned model systems
affect the CS pathway, emphasizing the universal
role stimulus substitution plays in classical
conditioning.
The relationship between classical conditioning
procedures and predictive learning has often pro-
vided the justification for using this paradigm to
study the neural bases of animals’ basic cognitive
or representational capacities. Nevertheless, it is
rarely recognized that, at an adaptive level, cogni-
tive capacities, such as those involved in encoding
the predictive relations between stimuli, can be of
little functional value to the purely Pavlovian organ-
ism. The sensitivity of cognitive systems to sources
of information would seem more likely to provide
the basis for modifying, even withholding or rever-
sing, the direction of behavior in response to that
information, something that demands greater beha-
vioral flexibility than the system mediating classical
conditioning provides. Hence, through developing
an understanding of operant conditioning, one may
actually come closer to establishing the functional
role of cognitive processes in behavior.
1.26.3.2 Invertebrate Operant Conditioning
Just as in classical conditioning, error signals from
unexpected events drive operant conditioning. The
main associative principles using these signals are
the concepts of initiating and gating behavioral
activity. In the naı¨ve animal, a behavior initially
without a biologically relevant consequence is sud-
denly followed by the perception of an unexpected
US. In sufficiently ambiguous situations, the animal
has to first initiate a number of behavioral programs
in order for the coincidence detectors to successfully
cross-correlate this behavior with the novel US
(‘trying out’): any of its behaviors around the given
time may have triggered the US. The significant
cross-correlation between behavior and US even-
tually leads to modifications that act as a gate,
letting only the behaviors pass that will maximize
reward or minimize punishment (operant behavior).
It is hypothesized that during operant conditioning
separate processes modify the subsequent, more per-
sistent initiation of behavior (operant memory). In
contrast to classical conditioning, there is evidence
from invertebrates on how the error signals may be
generated in the brain. Whenever an action is
initiated, a corollary discharge (or efference copy)
is fed forward as a control signal to be compared
with the sensory input. The difference between this
control signal (expectation) and the actual sensory
input generates the error signal (for a review, see
Webb, 2004).
Isolating a behavior from any consequences other
than a single biologically significant one (i.e., a US)
is difficult. Hence, it is not surprising that there are
only a few operant conditioning experiments which
have demonstrated a reduction analogous to classi-
cal conditioning (one predictor – one consequence,
BH! US).
Drosophila suspended at the torque meter is
probably as isolated from operant feedback as tech-
nically possible in an intact animal (Heisenberg
et al., 2001). Glued at head and thorax to a copper
wire hook, it is clamped to a device that measures
the fly’s yaw torque (yt) (i.e., the force the fly gen-
erates when it attempts to turn about its vertical
axis). The animal is tethered completely motionless
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and its visual environment is entirely homogeneous
(since the head is fixed). In such a constant stimulus
situation the animal may beat it wings, move its legs,
bend the abdomen, or extend the proboscis with no
consequences at all. The experimenter may choose
to make a biologically relevant stimulus (e.g., an
unpleasant heat beam, US) contingent on one of
the behaviors the animal generates. For the fly, it
means that without any warning from the environ-
ment, temperatures suddenly rise to an unpleasant
level. The animal has to find out how to switch the
heat off. There is no way the animal can know that
the experimenter coupled the heat with yt values
that correspond roughly to, say, right turns. The
animal has to find this correlation by trying out
different behaviors until it finds the correct flight
control maneuvers that eventually lead to more tol-
erable temperatures. This is a completely arbitrary
situation in which the animal has to spontaneously
produce a range of behaviors. This array of different
motor outputs must then be cross-correlated with
the sensory input. Only behaviors with significant
cross-correlations are to be maintained (gating). In
principle, such a gating mechanism is neurobiologi-
cally straightforward: the neurons generating the
relevant behaviors are active when the neuromodu-
lators signaling the heat on- and offset are being
released. These neurons will be modified by activ-
ity-dependent plasticity to bias any future behavior
toward the behaviors controlling the heat. Such a
process has been found in a similarly isolated beha-
vioral preparation, that is physiologically much
more accessible, the operant conditioning of feeding
behavior in Aplysia (Nargeot et al., 1997, 1999a,
1999b, 1999c; Brembs et al., 2002, 2004; Brembs,
2003a, 2003b). In this paradigm, spontaneous bites
(or the corresponding neural patterns in the reduced
preparation) are rewarded by dopamine-releasing
nerve stimulation. A series of experiments suggests
that dopamine-dependent modifications in the bio-
physical properties of a neuron that is active late
during the rewarded behavior (and is critical for
the type of behavior – biting) are partly responsible
for the increased probability of emitting biting beha-
vior in contingently reinforced animals as compared
to control animals.
Thus, similar to classical conditioning, the psy-
chological concept of behavior selection in operant
conditioning could be related to a neurobiological
mechanism.
However, it is more difficult to imagine the neu-
robiological mechanism which modifies behavior
initiation during operant conditioning. After all,
the initiation of the behavior may take place quite
some time before the US is perceived and therefore
the neurons initiating behavior may have been silent
for any amount of time. At the time of this writing,
there is only one hint as to whether behavior-initiat-
ing neurons actually are modified, but there is no
data about any possible mechanisms by which such
modification may occur. One is tempted to draw
from the concept of the efference copy to hypothe-
size about how this gap may be closed. Efference
copies are corollary discharges during behavior that
allow the animal to discern self-motion from passive
motion. The connection of this neural activity with
the sensory organs and the motor circuits make
efference copies suitable candidates for the memor-
ization of potential consequences of their respective
actions and thus the link between behavior selection
and initiation (Webb, 2004).
While there is no data confirming or falsifying
these speculations to date, there are more operant
conditioning paradigms which may be helpful in
understanding the biological implementation of
cognitive concepts in invertebrates.
The honeybee antennae can be operantly condi-
tioned to assume a certain posture (Kisch and Erber,
1999). In a more reduced preparation, the activity of
the fast flagellum flexor muscle is recorded extra-
cellularly from the scapus of the antenna (Erber
et al., 2000). Whenever the muscle activity exceeds
a defined reward threshold, the animal is rewarded
with a drop of sucrose solution. After several US
deliveries, the frequency of the muscle potentials
increases significantly over the spontaneous fre-
quency. The conditioned changes of frequency can
be observed for 30 min after conditioning and do
not occur in yoked controls, which were rewarded
independent of nerve activity.
Aversive operant conditioning of Lymnaea’s aer-
ial respiratory behavior involves stimulating the
animal’s pneumostome when it surfaces and
attempts to breathe (Lukowiak et al., 1996, 1998,
2000, 2003; Lukowiak and Syed, 1999; Spencer
et al., 1999; Haney and Lukowiak, 2001;
McComb et al., 2002, 2003; Sangha et al., 2002,
2003; Scheibenstock et al., 2002; Spencer et al.,
2002). The stimulation is aversive, which leads to
the animal closing the pneumostome and learning as
training progresses to reduce its attempts to open
the pneumostome. Instead of aerial respiration, the
animals rely on cutaneous respiration for oxygen
and hence it could be shown that the decrease in
pneumostome openings was not due to a generally
detrimental effect of the procedure. The neural net-
work mediating the behavior is simple and well
studied, making Lymnaea a very promising model
system for the understanding of behavior initiation
and selection.
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1.26.3.3 Invertebrate Composite Operant
Conditioning
Of course, in freely moving animals, a CS rarely
occurs independent of all the animal’s behaviors,
just as a US will very rarely be contingent on a
behavior independent of any other stimulus present.
Such situations (i.e., with a BH, a CS, and an US
present) are called composite operant conditioning.
Drosophila, Aplysia, and the honeybee are also the
most widely used model systems for studying com-
posite operant conditioning. Exploiting their unique
technical advantages, one paradigm each in both
Drosophila and Aplysia has been explicitly devel-
oped to combine operant and classical components
in a single preparation. If one adds coloration of the
(unpatterned) arena as a CS to the operant yaw
torque learning paradigm described above for
Drosophila, one creates an instance of composite
operant conditioning (Heisenberg et al., 2001).
Whenever the yaw torque of the fly is in one of the
two domains (roughly corresponding to left or right
turns, respectively), the arena surrounding the ani-
mal is illuminated in one color; if the yaw torque
moves into the other domain, the coloration changes
as well. Thus, yaw torque and color become equiva-
lent predictors of the punishing heat. This
switch (sw)-mode learning causes a larger after-
effect than yaw torque learning. This increased
effectiveness of composite over purely operant or
classical conditioning was observed previously,
comparing classical conditioning to flight-simulator
(fs) mode (Brembs and Heisenberg, 2000). In this
setup, the angular velocity is calculated from the on-
line torque signal that this momentum would give
the fly. But instead of turning the fly, the yaw torque
is made to turn the patterned arena around the fly in
the opposite direction. This arrangement enables
the fly to stabilize the arena, that is to fly straight
with respect to the patterns on the arena wall,
and to choose ‘flight directions’ with respect to
these patterns. Before the training, the fly shows
a moderate fixation of the patterns without a
striking preference for one or the other. During
training, the punishing heat beam is applied
whenever the fly chooses a flight direction
toward one of the pattern types. If after a few
minutes of training the heat is permanently
switched off the fly still prefers flight directions
toward the previously ‘cold’ patterns.
Is visual pattern discrimination learning operant?
The fly learns to associate the patterns (CS) with
heat and ‘no-heat’ (US), meeting the definition of
classical (Pavlovian) conditioning. Could the oper-
ant behavior in fs-learning merely accompany a
learning process which in essence is classical? The
standard experiment to answer this question is a
‘yoked’ control (Brembs and Heisenberg, 2000).
Exact sequences of pattern position and heating
periods are recorded during operant training and
are played back to a naı¨ve fly. The replay control
is a purely classical conditioning experiment, since
the fly has no influence on the stimuli presentation.
This kind of training is considerably less effective
than the training operantly controlled by the fly.
Thus, just as the sw-mode learning is more effective
than the yt-learning, the training in fs-learning is
more effective than in replay control. In other
words, in both cases the three-term contingency
(CS! US, BH! US) is more efficient than the
two-term contingency (BH! US in yt-learning;
CS! US in the yoked control of fs-learning). The
interesting difference is that in fs-learning the beha-
vior is not directly modified (Brembs and
Heisenberg, 2000), whereas in sw-learning the
spontaneous yt-distribution is altered just as in yt-
learning. This allowed investigating which of the
components are learned in the three-term contin-
gency (Heisenberg et al., 2001). These studies
showed that in both fs- and sw-learning only the
classical but not the operant association is sepa-
rately accessible, ruling out that the two act
additively. Not summation but rather interaction
between the operant and classical components char-
acterizes the three-term contingency. Apparently,
composite conditioning is so effective because learn-
ing about sensory stimuli is enhanced once the fly can
control them by its own behavior, whereas beha-
vioral modifications tend to be avoided (Heisenberg
et al., 2001). Experiments with robots have yielded
similar results, supporting the notion of a general
synergistic mechanism (Verschure et al., 2003).
Similar questions can now be asked in a newly
developed preparation in Aplysia. It was described
above how the feeding behavior of Aplysia can be
conditioned classically and operantly (Nargeot
et al., 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; Lechner et al.,
2000a, 2000b; Brembs et al., 2002, 2004; Brembs,
2003a, 2003b; Mozzachiodi et al., 2003). Taking
advantage of the greater physiological accessibility,
a reduced preparation of the isolated buccal and
cerebral ganglia was used. This preparation still
produces spontaneous nervous activity, which can
be recorded as patterned motor output at selected
motor nerves. These neuronal patterns can be
related to feeding behavior in the intact animal.
Stimulation of sensory nerves serves as CS and US
input. Thus, all elements of the three-term contin-
gency are present: BH, CS, and US. The preparation
has been shown to produce robust learning effects; it
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will be interesting to see if results can be found that
are analogous to those in Drosophila and, if so,
what their neural basis is (Brembs et al., 2004).
Susswein and colleagues have developed another
promising composite paradigm using Aplysia feed-
ing behavior (Susswein and Schwarz, 1983; Schwarz
and Susswein, 1984, 1986, 1992; Susswein et al.,
1986; Schwarz et al., 1991; Chiel and Susswein,
1993; Botzer et al., 1998; Katzoff et al., 2002).
Food touching the lips of Aplysia initiates biting,
which causes food to enter the mouth. Swallowing
is triggered by food within the mouth. Food or
nonfood objects in the mouth can also trigger
rejection (Kupfermann, 1974). In this aversive
procedure, animals learn to avoid biting on inedible
food items. Food is made inedible by wrapping it in
a plastic net that the animals can neither swallow
nor break. During training, the netted food touches
the lips and the animal tastes the food through holes
in the net. The animal bites, food enters the mouth
and elicits swallows, which fail to convey the tough
food to the gut. The food eventually is rejected.
The food continues to stimulate the lips and elicit
bites, which again lead to failed swallows. As
training proceeds, the response of the animal to the
food gradually changes. Food stays within the
mouth for progressively shorter periods, eliciting
fewer swallows and more rejections. Animals even-
tually stop responding to the food (Susswein et al.,
1986).
An instrument more suitable than the fs for using
the powerful genetic techniques in Drosophila for
operant conditioning is the heat box (Wustmann
et al., 1996; Wustmann and Heisenberg, 1997;
Putz and Heisenberg, 2002). In the tiny, dark cham-
ber, every time the fly walks into a designated half,
the whole chamber is heated. As soon as the animal
leaves the punished half, the chamber temperature
reverts to normal. Even if the heat is switched off
after a few minutes, the animals still restrict their
movements to only one half of the chamber. Because
it is completely dark in the chamber, the animal
most likely relies on idiothetic cues to orient itself,
thus minimizing the contamination with potential
classical predictors. It can be shown that the operant
memory consists of two components, a spatial com-
ponent and a ‘‘stay-where-you-are’’ component
(Putz and Heisenberg, 2002). One of the mutants
found using the heat box is the ‘ignorant’ gene (Putz,
2003; Putz et al., 2004). Interestingly, it appears
that ‘ignorant’ has very different effects on operant
and classical conditioning. The original mutant
allele (ignP1) shows a sexual dimorphism in the
heat box, where males are impaired but females
appear normal (Putz, 2003; Putz et al., 2004).
Both males and females of that line are statistically
indistinguishable from the wild-type controls in
olfactory classical conditioning (Bertolucci, 2003).
The null mutant (ign58/1) shows decreased learning
and memory in the classical case (Bertolucci, 2003),
but is normal in the heat box (Putz, 2003; Putz et al.,
2004). Finally, several partial deletions of the
ignorant gene are defective in the heat box (Putz,
2003; Putz et al., 2004), but these lines have not yet
been tested for classical conditioning. Apparently,
different mutations of the ‘ignorant’ gene have dif-
ferent effects on operant and classical conditioning,
indicating fairly well-separated mechanisms for
both forms of learning.
Another composite paradigm in honeybees and
bumblebees is visual discrimination learning in the
Y-maze. The freely flying bees enter a triangular
decision chamber on one side and can see two target
objects at the ends of the two arms of the ‘Y’
attached to the other two sides of the triangular
chamber. Only one of the two targets contains a
sucrose reward and thus animals can be trained to
associate one of the two targets with the reward.
Repeating the procedure with the targets at both
arms in random sequence establishes a visual discri-
mination memory that is independent of the
location of the target and hence of the turning man-
euvers needed to reach it. In this situation, bees learn
to associate a given target with reward and the
alternative target with the absence of reward such
that the former is excitatory and the latter inhibitory
(Giurfa et al., 1999). Furthermore, bees are
rewarded for every correct choice such that operant
and classical associations certainly drive their choice
within the maze. Several variants are known of this
kind of visual learning in bees: from the simple
visual target conditioning in which a bee has to
land on a single rewarded stimulus, to training
with a complex maze made from several connected
boxes, at the end of which they get rewarded with
sucrose solution (Zhang et al., 1999), bees effi-
ciently learn this kind of task which has allowed
further insights into higher-order forms of learning
(see Section 1.26.4).
1.26.4 Nonelemental Forms of
Associative Learning
In previous sections we reviewed different forms of
associative learning that can be described as elemen-
tal forms of learning. These forms have in common
that they can be formalized as links that connect
specific stimuli (in the case of Pavlovian condition-
ing), or a stimulus and a response (in the case of
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operant conditioning). In most of the paradigms
described, such links are established in such a way
that they connect directly and unambiguously well-
defined events in the animal’s environment
(Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). Simple links between
an event (A or B) and reinforcement (þ) (or its
absence: –) allow solving elemental problems such
as absolute conditioning (Aþ) and differential con-
ditioning (Aþ vs. B). In the former, an animal has
to learn to respond to A, which is unambiguously
associated with reinforcement; in the latter, it has to
learn to respond to A and not to B because A is
unambiguously associated with reinforcement and
B is unambiguously associated with the absence of
reinforcement.
However, invertebrates are also capable of more
complex forms of associative learning, which can be
described as nonelemental forms of learning, and
which in contraposition to elemental ones, do not
rely on simple links between events. In the study of
nonelemental learning, paradigms have been devel-
oped for which the associative strength of a specific
event, stimulus or reaction, is ambiguous and there-
fore cannot be predictive for solving a problem.
Such problems cannot be formalized, therefore, in
terms of simple connectivity between events and
their respective outcomes, because one or various
events involved in the problem usually allow
opposed outcomes (Pearce, 1994). For example: if
a given stimulus, A, is rewarded as often as not
rewarded, and the key for solving the problem is
that it is rewarded whenever it is presented together
with a different stimulus B, whereas it is nonre-
warded when presented together with a third
stimulus C (ABþ vs. AC), the animal cannot rely
on the pure associative strength of A to solve the
problem. Two possibilities appear: (1) the nonele-
mental one, in which the animal learns that it is the
configuration (AB or AC) which counts and which
has to be learned, independent of the associative
strength of the elemental stimuli A, B, C; and
(2) the elemental one in which the animal learns to
focus on B, which is always rewarded, and/or on C,
which is always nonrewarded. This example, and its
two possible interpretations which differ drastically,
show that in studying whether animals exhibit none-
lemental forms of learning, experiments must be
carefully designed in order to avoid dual interpreta-
tions for the same behavioral outcome.
Standard paradigms have been developed by
experimental psychologists to address this problem
in an efficient manner (Rudy and Sutherland, 1992,
1995). Simple links between a stimulus and reinforce-
ment do not allow solving nonelemental problems
like negative patterning, biconditional discrimination,
and the neutral discrimination feature (see discussion
below). In these problems, each stimulus appears
rewarded as often as nonrewarded such that linear
solutions do not apply. In negative patterning, for
instance, the subject has to learn to respond to the
single stimuli A and B but not to their compound
AB (Aþ, Bþ, AB). This problem does not admit
elemental solutions, since the animals learn that AB
has to be different from the linear sum of A and B.
In biconditional discrimination, the subject has to
learn to respond to the compounds AB and CD and
not to the compounds AC and BD (ABþ, CDþ,
AC, BD). As in the previous problem, each
element A, B, C, or D appears rewarded as often
as nonrewarded such that it is impossible to rely on
the associative strength of a given stimulus to solve
the task. Finally, in feature neutral discrimination,
the animal has to learn to respond to B and to the
compound AC but not to C and the compound AB
(Bþ, ACþ, C, AB). In this case, each element is
again ambiguous such that the animal has to learn
the predictive value of the compounds AB and AC,
independent of its composing elements, and the fact
that B and C alone produce different outcomes
than when in compound. These examples show to
which extent more elaborated computational stra-
tegies are necessary in the case of nonelemental
discrimination problems. In Section 1.26.6, other
elaborated forms of nonelemental learning are dis-
cussed such as contextual learning, or rule learning,
but here we focus on more formalized problems
such as the ones just introduced, which allow dis-
cerning between linear and nonlinear problem
solving. This distinction is pertinent not only with
respect to the nature of established associations, but
also with respect to the neural substrate subtending
these different forms of learning (Rudy and
Sutherland, 1995; Sutherland and Rudy, 1989). It
has been suggested that different neuronal circuits
and structures underlie elemental versus nonelemen-
tal learning in vertebrates, with a particular role
assigned to the hippocampus and the cortical cir-
cuitry associated to it in the formation of
nonelemental stimulus representations (Lachnit
et al., 2004; Rudy and Sutherland, 1995).
Lobsters placed in an aquarium can be aversively
conditioned to stop searching in it by pairing an
olfactory stimulus delivered in water with a
mechanosensory disturbance produced by the
experimenter (Livermore et al., 1997). Lobsters
were trained in this way with an olfactory com-
pound AX reinforced (AXþ). Conditioning was
either absolute (AXþ) or differential (AXþ vs.
AY). Both conditioning procedures yielded differ-
ent results, thus showing that depending on the
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conditioning schedule, lobsters treated and learned
the compound differently (Livermore et al., 1997).
After absolute conditioning, lobsters inhibited their
searching behavior when presented with AX but still
searched when presented with A, X or with a novel
odor Y. Similarly, a novel compound AY did not
inhibit searching behavior. This result is consistent
with learning the compound AX as an entity differ-
ent from its components A and X (the configural
view; Pearce, 1994). After differential conditioning,
lobsters inhibited their searching behavior when
presented with AX but not with AY. Interestingly,
they also inhibited search when presented with the
element X but not with the element Y. A was not
useful as it was common to the reinforced and the
nonreinforced compounds AXþ and AY, respec-
tively (Livermore et al., 1997). In this case, lobsters
seem to have learned the compounds AX and AY in
elemental terms, thus being able to fully generalize
their respective responses to X and Y.
In the honeybee, several recent studies have
addressed the issue of elemental versus nonelemen-
tal learning, using visual training of free-flying
animals or olfactory conditioning of harnessed ani-
mals. In both modalities, bees are able to solve a
biconditional discrimination (ABþ, CDþ, AC,
BD) – visual (Schubert et al., 2005); olfactory
(Chandra and Smith, 1998; Hellstern et al., 1995).
This capacity demonstrates that both visual and
olfactory compounds are learned under certain cir-
cumstances as entities different from the simple sum
of their elements. Similarly, negative patterning
experiments (Aþ, Bþ, AB) have also been per-
formed both in the visual (Schubert et al., 2005)
and the olfactory modality (Deisig et al., 2001,
2002). Such discrimination can only be explained
if the compound AB is treated as being different
from the simple sum of its elements. Two essential
theories can be invoked for explaining this result;
both are different from a purely linear approach
based solely on the elements of a compound: the
configural theory, mentioned above, which
proposes that a mixture constitutes an entity differ-
ent from its components (AB¼X 6¼ A þ B) (Pearce,
1994); and the unique-cue theory, which proposes
that a mixture is processed as the lineal sum of its
components plus a stimulus (u) that is unique to the
joint presentation of the elements in the mixture
(AB ¼ A þ Bþ u) (Whitlow and Wagner, 1972). In
the latter case, the unique cue supports the inhibi-
tory strength assigned to the compound. In the case
of honeybee olfactory learning, computer simula-
tions and experiments such as negative patterning
and its variants (Deisig et al., 2001, 2002, 2003)
showed that olfactory compound learning and
processing in bees was consistent with the unique-
cue theory. A unique cue is generated when bees
receive olfactory input to both brain sides, since
bilateral olfactory input is required to solve a nega-
tive patterning task (Komischke et al., 2003).
Assuming that the elements interfered with each
other is implied in a modified unique-cue theory
(Redhead and Pearce, 1995), which provided the
best account for all the behavioral results available
(Deisig et al., 2003; Lachnit et al., 2004).
Another paradigm used to study nonelemental
olfactory learning in bees is the side-specific olfac-
tory conditioning (Sandoz and Menzel, 2001). In
this case, a thin plastic wall separates the honey-
bee’s antennas during olfactory stimulation. Bees
were differentially conditioned using two odors: A
and B. Bees were conditioned with Aþ versus B
on one antenna and with A versus Bþ on the
other. This discrimination resembles a form of
contextual learning (see next section), since the
context of each antennal side (left vs. right)
determines the contingency of the stimuli. Bees
learned to respond appropriately to the rewarded
odor and to inhibit their reaction to the nonre-
warded odor on each side (Sandoz and Menzel,
2001). They thus solved this side-specific, non-
elemental discrimination.
This and two other paradigms were recently
used to test mushroom body (MB)-ablated honey-
bees and to determine whether intact MBs are
necessary to solve nonelemental olfactory discri-
minations (Komischke et al., 2005). Bees with
unilateral lesions of the MBs generated by larval
treatment with hydroxyurea (Malun, 1998) were
trained under different olfactory conditioning
designs. When odorants were delivered in a side-
specific manner, bees with unilateral MB lesions
could not solve an unambiguous double discrimi-
nation (paradigm 1: Aþ, B on one antenna, Cþ,
D on the other; A þ B/CþD), whereas they
could solve at least one of both discriminations of
an ambiguous problem (paradigm 2: Aþ, B on
one antenna , A, Bþ on the other; Aþ B/
A  Bþ). In the latter case, they solved the discri-
mination proposed to their intact brain side.
Nonablated bees could learn both side-specific
discriminations. When odorants were delivered
simultaneously to both antennas (paradigm 3:
A þ B  Cþ D), ablated bees learned slower
than normal bees. Thus, in all three cases, the
unilateral loss of a median calyx affected olfactory
learning (Komischke et al., 2005). It was proposed
that MBs are required for solving elemental olfac-
tory tasks whose complexity is enhanced by virtue
of the number of stimuli involved (paradigms 1
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and 3: four stimuli) and that MB ablations could
have an effect on the inhibition of information
exchange between brain hemispheres. This
exchange may or may not occur in normal cir-
cumstances, depending on the information stored
in each brain side. MB lesions would impede the
ablated side to block the transfer of information
from the intact side in the side-specific ambiguous
problem (paradigm 2).
Interestingly, cumulative experience seems to
play a critical role for adopting elemental or none-
lemental learning strategies (Giurfa et al., 2003).
Giurfa et al. (2003) trained free-flying bees to fly
into a Y-maze to collect sucrose solution on a
rewarded stimulus presented in one of the arms of
the maze. Stimuli were color disks, violet (V), green
(G), or yellow (Y), which were of equal perceptual
salience for honeybees. Training followed an Aþ,
BCþ design, followed by an AC versus BC test.
Training consisted of 6 (3 Aþ and 3 BCþ), 20 (10
Aþ and 10 BCþ), or 40 (20 Aþ and 20 BCþ)
acquisition trials. Elemental models of compound
processing predict that in the test, a preference for
the nontrained stimulus AC should occur while
configural models predict a preference for the
trained stimulus BC. After six training trials, bees
favored an elemental strategy and preferred AC to
BC during the tests. Increasing the number of train-
ing trials resulted in an increase of the choice of BC.
Thus, short training favored processing the com-
pound as the sum of its elements (elemental
account) while long training favored its processing
as being different from the sum of its elements
(configural account). Additionally, it was observed
that the change in stimulus processing was also
influenced by stimulus similarity. Color perceptual
similarity favored configural processing with
increasing experience (Giurfa et al., 2003), a result
that was consistent with the results of honeybee
olfactory compound conditioning (Deisig et al.,
2002).
It thus seems that some invertebrates, at least
lobsters and honeybees, are capable of nonelemental
forms of learning in the strict sense, and that such
forms of learning are highly dependent on the way
in which animals are trained, on the number of
trials, and on the similarity between elements in a
compound. Further factors favoring nonelemental
compound processing and learning could be the
spatial and temporal proximity of elements and the
animals’ previous experience. Further research
should ask whether or not other invertebrate models
can solve such nonlinear discrimination problems
and determine the kind of processing underlying
this problem solving.
1.26.5 Integration Across Sensory
Modalities and Rule Learning
Animals, including invertebrates, can sometimes
respond to novel stimuli that they have never before
encountered or can generate novel responses that
are adaptive given the context in which they are
produced. In doing this, the animals exhibit a posi-
tive transfer of learning (Robertson, 2001), a
capacity that cannot be referred to as an elemental
form of learning because the responses are aimed
toward stimuli that do not predict a specific out-
come per se based on the animals’ past experience.
Moreover, animals can also learn to inhibit such a
transfer in order to produce adaptive responses that
can be linked to a specific context. They learn that,
given a certain stimulus or condition, a particular
response is appropriate, whereas, given a different
stimulus or condition, the same response is no
longer appropriate. This form of learning, usually
referred as conditional learning or occasion setting,
cannot be viewed as elemental learning, since a
given stimulus may or not be predictive of a certain
outcome, depending on the particular environment.
Relying on its elemental outcome alone therefore
does not help solving this kind of problem. In this
section, we focus on these forms of nonelemental
learning. We therefore deal with three main capa-
cities: (1) selective attention, (2) rule learning, and
(3) contextual learning. We start with selective
attention, as it seems to be a necessary requisite for
extracting the information that allows solving the
other two problems.
1.26.5.1 Selective Attention
Selective attention consists of the ability to focus
perceptual mechanisms on a particular stimulus
and to actively process this information while ignor-
ing nonrelevant stimuli (Zentall, 2005). It implies
that the representation of the stimulus has been
filtered or modified, presumably so that it can be
processed or responded to more efficiently.
Different approaches have been proposed to the
notion of selective attention. Here we focus on the
ecological notion of ‘search image’ (Tinbergen,
1960) and on the more traditional approach of dis-
criminative learning to selective attention (Zentall
and Riley, 2000).
Selective attention could be related to the notion
of search image, since such images are assumed to
exist in cruising animals in order to facilitate detec-
tion of relevant stimuli in the environment. Search
images, which could be innate (see Section 1.26.2)
or acquired through experience in the field, have
been proposed to be a specific means for filtering
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out sensory information and focusing perception on
specific stimulus configurations as a way to more
efficiently forage and avoid predation. Innate search
images driving the first foraging flights are assumed
in insect pollinators, in order to facilitate the detec-
tion of flower sources (Menzel, 1985). Indeed, naı¨ve
bees exhibit innate preferences for biologically rele-
vant floral cues such as colors (Giurfa et al., 1995;
Gumbert, 2000) or bilateral symmetry (Rodriguez
et al., 2004). Salticid spiders have also an innate
predisposition to form search images for preferred
preys (spiders) rather than for nonpreferred preys
(insects) (Jackson and Li, 2004).
Traditionally, selective attention has been studied
through a discriminative learning approach. Such an
approach posits that through selective attention ani-
mals gradually learn to attend to the dimension
along which discriminative stimuli differ
(Mackintosh, 1975). Honeybees (Giurfa, 2004)
and bumblebees (Dyer and Chittka, 2004) discrimi-
nate differently a given color after absolute (training
with a single reinforced color) and differential con-
ditioning (training with a reinforced color and
nonreinforced alternatives). They become progres-
sively better in discriminating the trained color from
colors that are perceptually close after prolonged
differential conditioning while they are incapable
of such discrimination after the same amount of
absolute conditioning These results can be inter-
preted along the selective attention hypothesis such
that insects gradually learned to attend to the spec-
tral dimension along which discriminative stimuli
differed. An alternative interpretation posits that
differentially conditioned animals form positive
and negative generalization gradients to the
rewarded and the unrewarded stimulus, respec-
tively, and thus develop a sharper generalization
profile for the learned stimulus. An attentional
account may also apply to pattern discrimination
experiments in which bees do or do not discriminate
the same two patterns depending on the kind of
training used, absolute or differential conditioning
(Giurfa et al., 1999). Absolute conditioning pro-
moted recognition based on local cues (the lower
half of a disk made of different sectors) while differ-
ential conditioning expanded it to the whole
pattern.
Arguments in favor of selective attention in inver-
tebrates come from research on the fruit fly
D. melanogaster (van Swinderen and Greenspan,
2003). A fly flying stationary within a circular
arena and tracking a visual moving object (a vertical
black bar) exhibits behavioral and neural processes
consistent with selective attention for visual stimuli.
Local field potentials recorded in the central brain of
these flies show that activity in the 20–30 Hz range
increases as a response to the moving bar when it
appears in the visual field of the fly and before the
insect initiates tracking. This neural response, which
is interpreted as being related to the perceptual event
occurring at the onset of stimulus tracking, can be
retraced to the mushroom bodies. It increases by
novelty and odor-evoked salience, it is anticipatory,
and it is reduced when the fly is in a sleep-like state.
These results suggest that selective attention under-
lies visual tracking in flies.
1.26.5.2 Rule Learning
Selective attention constitutes the very basis of rule
learning, because in such a process animals learn to
focus attention on the relevant information that
allows detecting the rule underlying the problem to
be solved. Rule learning presupposes positive trans-
fer of an appropriate response from a known set to a
novel set of stimuli. In this case, the animal bases its
choice not on the perceptual similarity between the
novel and the known stimuli, which might not share
any common feature, but on a rule which transcends
the stimuli used to train it. Examples of such rules
are ‘larger than’, or ‘on top of’, which may apply to
stimuli which do not share any common feature but
which can nevertheless be classified according to the
rule. Other examples are the so-called principles of
sameness and of difference. These rules are uncov-
ered through delayed matching to sample (DMTS)
and the delayed nonmatching to sample (DNMTS)
experiments, respectively. In DMTS, animals are
presented with a sample and then with a set of
stimuli, one of which is identical to the sample and
which is reinforced. Since the sample is regularly
changed, they must learn the sameness rule ‘always
choose what is shown to you (the sample), indepen-
dent of what else is shown to you’. In DNMTS, the
animal has to learn the opposite, that is ‘always
choose the opposite of what is shown to you (the
sample)’.
Honeybees foraging in a Y-maze learn both rules
(Giurfa et al., 2001). Bees were trained in a DMTS
problem in which they were presented with a chan-
ging nonrewarded sample (i.e., one of two different
color disks or one of two different black-and-white
gratings, vertical or horizontal) at the entrance of a
maze. The bees were rewarded only if they chose the
stimulus identical to the sample once within the
maze. Bees trained with colors and presented in
transfer tests with gratings that they have not
experienced before solved the problem and chose
the grating identical to the sample at the entrance
of the maze. Similarly, bees trained with the gratings
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and tested with colors in transfer tests also solved
the problem and chose the novel color correspond-
ing to that of the sample grating at the maze
entrance. Transfer was not limited to different
kinds of modalities (pattern vs. color) within the
visual domain, but could also operate between dras-
tically different domains such as olfaction and
vision (Giurfa et al., 2001). Furthermore, bees also
mastered a DNMTS task, thus showing that they
also learned a principle of difference between sti-
muli (Giurfa et al., 2001). These results document
that bees learn rules relating stimuli in their envir-
onment. The capacity of honeybees to solve DMTS
tasks has recently been verified (Zhang et al., 2004,
2005). It was found that the working memory for
the sample underlying the solving of DMTS is ,5 s
(Zhang et al., 2005) and thus coincides with the
duration of other visual and olfactory short-term
memories characterized in simpler forms of associa-
tive learning in honeybees (see Section 1.26.6).
Moreover, bees trained in a DMTS task can learn
to pay attention to one of two different samples
presented successively in a flight tunnel (either to
the first or to the second) and can transfer the learn-
ing of this sequence weight to novel samples (Zhang
et al., 2005).
Despite the honeybees’ evident capacity to solve
relational problems such as the DMTS or the
DNMTS tasks, such capacities are not unlimited.
In some cases, biological constraints may impede
the solving of a particular problem for which rule
extraction is necessary. It is therefore interesting to
focus on a different example of rule learning which
bees could not master, the transitive inference pro-
blem (Benard and Giurfa, 2004). In this problem,
animals have to learn a transitive rule, that is,
A> B, B> C, then A> C. Preference for A over
C in this context can be explained by two strategies:
(1) deductive reasoning (Fersen et al., 1990) in
which the experimental subjects construct and
manipulate a unitary and linear representation of
the implicit hierarchy A> B> C; or (2) responding
as a function of reinforced and not reinforced
experiences (Terrace and McGonigle, 1994), in
which case animals choose among stimuli based on
their associative strength, that is, on the effective
number of reinforced and nonreinforced experi-
ences with the stimuli.
To determine whether bees learn the transitive
rule, they were trained using five different visual
stimuli A, B, C, D, and E in a multiple discrimina-
tion task Aþ versus B, Bþ versus C, Cþ versus
D, and Dþ versus E (Benard and Giurfa, 2004).
Training therefore involved overlapping of adjacent
premise pairs (A> B, B> C, C>D, D> E),
which underlie a linear hierarchy
A> B> C> D> E. After training, bees were
tested with B versus D, a nonadjacent pair of stimuli
that were never explicitly trained together. In the-
ory, B and D have equivalent associative strengths
because they are, in principle, equally associated
with reinforcement or absence of it during training.
Thus, if bees were guided by the stimulus’ associa-
tive strength, they should choose randomly between
B and D. If, however, bees used a transitive rule,
they should prefer B to D.
Honeybees learned the premise pairs as long as
these were trained as uninterrupted, consecutive
blocks of trials (Benard and Giurfa, 2004). But if
shorter and interspersed blocks of trials were used,
such that bees had to master all pairs practically
simultaneously, performance collapsed and bees
did not learn the premise pairs. The bees’ choice
was significantly influenced by their experience
with the last pair of stimuli (Dþ vs. E) such that
they preferred D and avoided E. In the tests, no
preference for B to D was found. Although this
result agrees with an evaluation of stimuli in terms
of their associative strength (see above), during
training bees visited more B when it was rewarding
than D, such that a preference for B should have
been expected if only the associative strength were
guiding the bees’ choices. It was then concluded that
bees do not establish transitive inferences between
stimuli but rather guide their choices by the joint
action of a recency effect (preference of the last
rewarded stimulus, D) and by an evaluation of the
associative strength of the stimuli (in which case
preference for B should be evident). As the former
supports choice of D while the latter supports choice
of B, equal choice of B and D in the tests could be
explained (Benard and Giurfa, 2004). In any case,
memory constraints (in this case the fact that simul-
taneous mastering of the different premise pairs was
not possible and the fact that the last excitatory
memory seems to predominate over previous mem-
ories) impeded learning the transitive rule.
1.26.5.3 Conditional Discriminations: Occasion
Setting and Contextual Learning
Contextual learning is a term widely used for
describing conditional discriminations which can
be subsumed in the so-called occasion setting pro-
blem (Schmajuk and Holland, 1998). In this
problem, a given stimulus, the occasion setter,
informs the animal about the outcome of its choice
(for instance, given stimulus C, the occasion setter,
the animal has to choose A and not B because the
former but not the latter is rewarded). This basic
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form of conditional learning admits different var-
iants depending on the number of occasion setters
and discriminations involved, which have received
different names. For instance, another form of occa-
sion setting involving two occasion setters is the so-
called transwitching problem. In this problem, an
animal is trained differentially with two stimuli, A
and B, and with two different occasion setters, C1
and C2. When C1 is available, stimulus A is
rewarded while stimulus B is not (Aþ vs. B),
while it is the opposite (A vs. Bþ) with C2.
Focusing on the elements alone does not allow sol-
ving the problem as each element (A, B) appears
equally as often rewarded and nonrewarded. Each
occasion setter (C1, C2) is, in the same way, simul-
taneously rewarded and nonrewarded, depending
on its association with A or B. Animals have, there-
fore, to learn that C1 and C2 define the valid
contingency. The transwitching problem is consid-
ered a form of contextual learning because the
occasion setters C1 and C2 can be viewed as con-
texts determining the appropriateness of each
choice. Note that a problem like the biconditional
discrimination (ABþ, CDþ, BC, AD; see Section
1.26.4) is amenable to a transwitching problem, and
thus to an occasion-setting problem, if one assumes
that A and C act as occasion setters for B and D (i.e.,
given A, Bþ vs. D, and given C, B vs. Dþ). This
is so because all these problems are forms of condi-
tional learning in which a stimulus can have
different associates depending on the conditions in
which it is presented.
Despite semantic confusions, conditional discri-
minations viewed as contextual learning have been
studied in several invertebrate models. We will keep
the term ‘contextual learning’ as it appears recur-
rently in the works that we will discuss from here
on. In the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans, reten-
tion of habituation of an escape response is aided by
contextual associations formed during training
(Rankin, 2000; see also Section 1.26.6).
Nematodes were trained and tested in the presence
of a chemosensory cue (NaCH3COO) which was
used as the general context surrounding the animals.
Animals trained and tested in different chemosen-
sory environments showed lower retention than
animals that stayed in the same context. In the
same animal, Law et al. (2004) used taste cues to
create distinct contexts for olfactory adaptation
assays and showed that performance in this associa-
tive learning paradigm is sensitive to context
manipulations. In Aplysia californica, Colwill et al.
(1988) showed that animals exposed to two differ-
ent contexts, a smooth, round bowl containing
lemon-flavored seawater and a rectangular chamber
with a ridged surface containing unscented seawater
that was gently vibrated by an aerator located in one
corner, and receiving a series of moderate electric
shocks (US) in one of these two contexts, established
an association between the context and the shock.
The context alone elicited a defensive reaction
which was exclusive for the reinforced context. In
the freshwater pond snail Lymnaea stagnalis, aerial
respiratory behavior was operantly conditioned so
that the animals performed aerial respiration signif-
icantly less often (Lukowiak et al., 1996; see also
Section 1.26.3). Recall of the learned behavior was
dependent on the context in which memory was
established. Animals trained in water containing
food odorant (the contextual cue) exhibited recall
only in the presence of such food odorant context
(Haney and Lukowiak, 2001).
Arthropods have provided reliable evidence of
contextual learning. Hermitte et al. (1999) found
that in the crab Chasmagnathus, spaced and massed
training with an opaque screen moving overhead
produced different forms of long-term habituation
(LTH) of an escape response: LTH acquired by
spaced but not by massed training was affected
negatively by a change in context, provided by dif-
ferent visual cues around the bowl in which animals
are kept. In the fruit fly D. melanogaster, the inci-
dence of context on visual learning was analyzed
using the flight simulator (see Section 1.26.3) in
which a fly has to learn to fly stationary toward
surrounding T-shaped patterns (upright and
inverted) used as landmarks and presented on a
surrounding screen. Context variation in this aver-
sive learning paradigm was provided by a change in
the color of the illuminating light (Liu et al., 1999).
Normal flies transferred appropriate responses
toward patterns from a trained to a new context
providing that the chromatic differences between
the two contextual lights were not too large (Liu
et al., 1999). MB defective flies were unable to
realize such a transfer and could not therefore
remember the information learned in one context
in a different one. These results suggest that the MBs
help to stabilize visual memory with respect to con-
text changes and thus allow the memory of an event
to be stored and then retrieved in different situations
(Liu et al., 1999).
Matsumoto and Mizunami (2004) have shown
that crickets Gryllus bimaculatus associate one of
a pair of odors with water reward (appetitive US)
and another odor with saline solution (aversive US)
under illumination, and learn the reversed contin-
gency in the dark. Thus, crickets solved this variant
of the transwitching problem (see above) and the
visual context affected learning performance only
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when crickets were requested to use it to disambig-
uate the meaning of stimuli and to predict the nature
of reinforcement.
Bumblebees have also been trained in a trans-
witching problem to choose a 45 grating and to
avoid a 135 grating to reach a feeder, and to do
the opposite to reach their nest (Fauria et al., 2002).
They can also learn that an annular or a radial disk
must be chosen, depending on the disk’s association
with a 45 or a 135 grating either at the feeder or
the nest entrance: in one context, the nest, access to
it was allowed by the combinations 45 þ radial
disk and 135 þ annular disk, but not by the com-
binations 45 þ annular disk and 135 þ radial
disk; at the feeder, the opposite was true (Fauria
et al., 2000). In both cases, the potentially compet-
ing visuomotor associations were insulated from
each other because they were set in different con-
texts. Comparable behavior was found in honeybees
where distinct odors or times of the day (Menzel
et al., 1998) were the occasion setters for a given
flight vector.
Further examples for contextual learning in hon-
eybees could be provided (e.g., Gerber and Menzel,
2000). The rich Russian literature on this subject is
summarized in Kartsev (1996) and Mazokhin-
Porschnyakov and Kartsev (1994), but they would
be redundant for the main conclusion of this section
which is that there is abundant evidence of condi-
tional learning in invertebrates, which can be
described as occasion setting or contextual learning.
However, the nature of the associations underlying
this kind of learning and its neural substrates remain
unclear.
1.26.6 Memory Systems
Memories exist in multiple forms and functions.
They are categorized according to their physiological
substrates along a timescale as short-term, mid-term,
and long-term memory (STM, MTM, LTM), refer-
ring to ongoing neural activity as the storage device
of STM, intercellular signaling cascades leading to
MTM, and gene activation, protein synthesis, and
new structures underlying LTM. The transitions
between these memory stages or phases can be
sequential or parallel, processes referred to as phy-
siological correlates of consolidation, a phenomenon
originally known from human psychological studies
(see Human Cognitive Specializations) capturing the
fact that over time early, vulnerable forms of memory
are converted into more stable and long-lasting forms
(Ebbinghaus, 1964; Mu¨ller and Pilzecker, 1900).
Two processes of memory formation have already
been introduced: the distinction between
phylogenetic (the species’ memory) and individually
acquired memory (memory from learning). The
relationship between these two forms of memory
concerning their different molecular and cellular
substrates – but also their corresponding mechan-
isms of expression (Fox et al., 1998) – is of utmost
importance in the study of behavior and cognition,
but is poorly understood. Here we focus on experi-
ence-dependent memory.
The term experience-dependent memory sub-
sumes two processes in the brain, storing and
retrieving information. A content of memory that
is potentially retrievable but not actually retrieved is
often referred to as ‘remote memory’, whereas
‘working memory’ captures the fact that retrieved
and updated information exists in an active form
that allows predictions to be made about potential
outcomes of actions. Working memory is probably
the most important concept in describing cognitive
processes, since it is considered the interface
between evaluated earlier events and future events
in the context of the animal’s current needs and
motivations. Memory systems are also categorized
according to their contents, and in vertebrates par-
ticular brain structures are related to it, for example
procedural memory (e.g., cerebellum), episodic
memory (hippocampus, prefrontal cortex), and
emotional memory (amygdala). Whereas proce-
dural memory certainly exists in invertebrates and
may be distributed over their ganglionic nervous
systems, it is debatable whether any animal pos-
sesses episodic memory, the ability to carry out
long-term recall of sequences of events or narratives
(see, for instance, Suddendorf and Busby, 2003, and
reply by Clayton et al., 2003a). In humans, this
property is intimately related to the functions of
the hippocampus and cerebral cortex. It is argued
that food-storing birds may develop an episodic-like
memory about a kind of food stored at a certain
place and at a certain time. Pollinating insects cer-
tainly control their foraging activities according to
the kind of food they collect at a particular place
and at a specific time of day, but it is unknown
whether they make decisions between options inte-
grating the what, where, and when of potential food
sites (see Section 1.26.7).
Memory systems are highly dynamic and content
sensitive. Any retrieval from the memory store will
change its content due to the updating process in
working memory. It is this updating process that
may lead to extracting rules which underlie general-
ization, categorization, and implicit forms of
abstraction (see Section 1.26.7). Furthermore,
retrieval from memory store also induces new learn-
ing, and consequently consolidation into new
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memory, a process referred to as ‘reconsolidation’
(see discussion below).
It may be expected that the structure and
dynamics of memory systems have been shaped by
the evolutionary history of the species, and may thus
reflect species-specific adaptations to the require-
ments posed by the environment. Little is known
about these ecological adaptations of the memory
system, because animal models of memory are
rarely studied with respect to their natural behavior
in order to detect possible correlates between beha-
vioral and memory dynamics. However, appetitive
learning in the honeybee provides certain insights
into this question (see discussion below).
1.26.6.1 Physiological Correlates of Memory
Systems
In bacteria and ciliates the memory for sensory
adaptation and habituation of innate responses lies
in the temporal dynamics of second messengers and
their targets (see Section 1.26.2). The nematode
C. elegans habituates to mechanical stimulation,
and the duration of the memory depends on the
number and intervals of the stimuli. Since retention
of habituation differs for different chemical context
conditions, it has been proposed that some form of
associative learning may be involved (Steidl and
Rankin, 2002). The 24 h memory, but not an early
memory, depends on protein synthesis, thus indicat-
ing an early and a late memory phases. C. elegans
provides excellent opportunities to study the mole-
cular, cellular, and network properties of learning
and memory, but since associative learning and its
memory phases have not yet been convincingly
documented, this model system awaits further pro-
gress before it will become useful for such studies
(see Rankin, 2004 for further discussion).
The memories of various forms of learning have
been intensively studied in several species of
mollusks (Tritonia diomedea, Hermissenda crassi-
cornis, Limax maximus, L. stagnalis, Helix pomatia,
Pleurobranchaea californica, A. californica; Byrne,
2002). The focus in these studies lies on nonassocia-
tive forms of learning such as habituation and
sensitization and on their physiological correlates,
depression and facilitation. Pavlovian conditioning
was studied in Hermissenda, Limax, and Lymnaea,
and as in nonassociative learning, two major phases of
memory were found, STM and LTM. The cellular
correlates of short-term and long-term sensitization
have been studied in greatest detail in Aplysia
(Kandel, 2001). Short-term sensitization lasts for
seconds and minutes and involves the modification
of neuronal membrane properties and synaptic
efficacy, often through the alteration of the phosphor-
ylation state of existing proteins. Long-term
sensitization lasts from days to weeks, depending on
the training protocol (spaced trials lead to longer
memory than massed trials). It requires synthesis of
new macromolecules, since the inhibition of either
gene transcription into mRNA or translation of
mRNA into protein blocks long-term sensitization.
In its most persistent form, long-term sensitization
involves morphological changes and neuronal growth.
In all these respects, the studies of Aplysia sensiti-
zation are exemplary and paradigmatic for any
research on the cellular basis of learning and mem-
ory (Milner et al., 1998). In the context of the
relationship between phylogenetic and experience-
dependent memory, studies on the mechanistic
relationship between development and learning
are particularly interesting (Carew, 2002). In
Aplysia, the nonassociative forms of plasticity in
the sensory–motor connection of the siphon with-
drawal response appear sequentially during early
development: first habituation, then dishabitua-
tion, and then sensitization, indicating that the
two facilitatory processes dishabituation and sensi-
tization are mechanistically different. This
interpretation is supported by the finding that the
sequential appearance of plasticity phenomena at
the sensory motor synapses corresponds to these
forms of plasticity. Synaptic decrement of the sen-
sory–motor synapse appears first in development,
then facilitation of the decremented EPSPs, then
facilitation of the nondecremented EPSPs, and,
finally, an inhibition of nondecremented EPSPs
appears in stage 12 of Aplysia development. The
development of the inhibitory process can be nicely
related to a maturation effect of sensitization in
which strong stimuli become less effective in later
developmental stages. Follow-up studies (Nolen
and Carew, 1988) also demonstrated in adult
Aplysia that dishabituation and sensitization are
two different forms of facilitatory plasticity, at
both the behavioral and the neural levels.
Furthermore, it was found that long-term forms
of sensitization emerge at the same time of devel-
opment as short-term forms (stage 12), indicating
that STM and LTM memory are mechanistically
interrelated (Wright et al., 1996). These studies are
of general importance because they document that
the nonassociative forms of learning (habituation,
sensitization) reflect not only two opposing pro-
cesses but rather are composed of four behavioral
processes, two decrementing (habituation, inhibi-
tion) and two facilitatory.
Using molecular genetic tools in Drosophila, four
distinct memory stages have been found following
Cognition in Invertebrates 421
aversive olfactory conditioning: STM, MTM,
anesthesia-resistant memory (ARM), and LTM
(Tully et al., 1994). Among the several mutants
that have been analyzed with respect to their mem-
ories, rutabaga (rut) and amnesiac (amn) yielded the
most information about their cellular mechanisms
and the localization of STM and LTM in the
Drosophila brain (Heisenberg, 2003; Isabel et al.,
2004). Rut encodes a calcium-sensitive adenylylcy-
clase, and amnesiac encodes a neuropeptide similar
to vertebrate PACAP (pituitary adenylylcyclase-
activating peptide). Rut mutants learn normally,
but suffer from reduced STM that can be rescued
in transgenic flies expressing the gene in a subpopu-
lation of mushroom body neurons (g-lobe neurons;
Zars et al., 2000). Amn mutants lack PACAP-
expressing neurons, and two of these neurons
extrinsic to the mushroom body are essential for
the transition to LTM (Feany and Quinn, 1995).
Structural mutants with lesions restricted to the
alpha lobe of the mushroom body specifically abol-
ish LTM (Pascual and Preat, 2001; Dubnau et al.,
2001). Taken together with the analysis of several
other single-gene mutants, these observations sug-
gest that olfactory learning and memory depend, at
least in part, on the activity of MB neurons.
Different MB neurons may be involved in storing
different memories, but currently nothing is known
about how the transfer occurs between these neu-
rons during consolidation from STM to LTM. So far
only very few of the many neurons certainly
involved in memory formation in Drosophila have
been studied. It is estimated that more than 1000
genes are transcriptionally regulated during olfac-
tory LTM formation (Dudai, 2002).
Reward learning in honeybees initiates a sequence
of memory phases which lead to long-lasting mem-
ory passing through at least four forms of memory
(Menzel and Mu¨ller, 1996; Menzel, 1999). An asso-
ciative-learning trial induces an early form of short-
term memory (eSTM) in the seconds range. This
memory is highly dominated by appetitive arousal
and sensitization, is rather unspecific, and is quickly
converted into a late STM (lSTM). At the cellular
level, stimulus association is reflected in the conver-
gence of excitation of the conditioned stimulus
pathway of the (odor) via nicotinic acetylcholine
receptors (nAChRs) in the antennal lobe and the
MB, and the pathway for the unconditioned stimu-
lus, the putatively octopaminergic neuron VUMmx1,
most likely acting on octopamine receptor II recep-
tors. In the antennal lobe, both cAMP/PKA and
Ca2þ-dependent PKC are upregulated during STM,
and the cAMP/PKA signaling cascade is indicative
of the associative component (Mu¨ller, 2000).
However, unlike in Drosophila, blocking the
cAMP/PKA pathway does not interfere with learn-
ing and STM. The transition to MTM is a rather
slow process and makes the memory trace unsuscep-
tible to retrograde amnesic treatments. Single and
multiple learning trials lead to different long-term
forms of memory (LTM, see discussion below). An
important molecular component in the transition to
LTM formation is enhanced and prolonged PKA
activity after multiple learning trials. Two lines of
evidence support the conclusion that LTM forma-
tion requires enhanced PKA activity shortly after
multiple trial learning, but is not involved in the
learning process itself: (1) blocking NO synthase
during lSTM reduces PKA activity and impedes
LTM formation (Mu¨ller, 1996); (2) enhancing
PKA activity by uncaging cAMP in the antennal
lobe after a single learning trial facilitates the for-
mation of LTM in the same way as multiple trials do
(Mu¨ller, 2000). MTM is characterized by a first
wave of PKC activity (Gru¨nbaum and Mu¨ller,
1998). The constitutive activation of PKC is a pro-
teolytic process of formation of PKM that lasts for
several hours. Inhibition of proteases in the whole
brain reduces the formation of PKM and blocks
retention during the MTM phase. LTM formation
is also blocked in this way, indicating that protein
synthesis-dependent LTM and high levels of long-
lasting PKC activity (until the third day after con-
ditioning) are formed parallel to PKM-dependent
MTM.
Two forms of LTM must be distinguished in hon-
eybees: early LTM (1–2 days) characterized by
translation-dependent retention and constitutively
active PKC, and late LTM (3 days) characterized
by transcription-dependent retention and no more
enhanced PKC activity. The two forms of LTM arise
differently, after massed and spaced multiple learn-
ing trials (Menzel et al., 2001). Memory resulting
from spaced trials is blocked by protein synthesis
inhibitors, whereas memory resulting from massed
conditioning trials (intertrial interval 30 s) is inde-
pendent of protein synthesis.
1.26.6.2 Working Memory: Capacity and Duration
The capacity and time span of working memory has
been estimated in invertebrates only for the honey-
bee in the appetitive context of nectar foraging. As
pointed out above, very short intervals (<1 min)
between a learning and a test trial lead to high but
rather unspecific responses, while long intervals lead
to specific responses of the learned stimulus. Chittka
et al. (1997) recorded the frequency of intervals
between stay and shift flights made by bumblebees
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foraging on more than two plant species. Stay flights
appear at shorter intervals (,2 s) than shift flights,
indicating that immediate choices are dominated by
the most recent and the most effective STM, but
reference to more remote memories needs more
time. To interpret it from another perspective, one
could say that longer intervals release working
memory from the dominant memory of the last
visit and allow for contributions from an earlier
memory that has meanwhile been consolidated.
Greggers and Menzel (1993) found for bees foraging
in a patch of four feeders that delivered different
flow rates of sucrose solution that they store the
reward properties of these feeders in working mem-
ory. Similar results were found for eight feeders,
indicating that the reward properties of eight feeders
can also be stored in feeder-specific memories. The
capacity of working memory is, therefore, at least
eight items. The time range of these specific working
memories could be estimated as lying around 6 min.
Recently, working memory in foraging honeybees
has also been estimated using the DMTS procedure
(see Section 1.26.4 and Giurfa et al., 2001), in which
a free-flying bee is exposed to a visual stimulus (the
sample) through which it should fly to then subse-
quently choose between two options, one of which
corresponds to the sample. If the bee matches its
choice to the sample it is rewarded with sucrose
solution (Giurfa et al., 2001). Using this paradigm,
Zhang et al. (2005) estimated the duration of the
working memory for the sample, which allows a bee
to choose between alternatives after passing though
it. The duration of such a working memory was
around 5 s. Longer delays between exposure to the
sample and subsequent choice of stimuli result in
random choices.
1.26.6.3 Reconsolidation
When memory is retrieved from a remote store by
exposing the animal to the learned stimulus without
reinforcement (extinction), two processes are
initiated: extinction learning, due to the fact that
the stimulus originally associated with reinforce-
ment is now presented without it, and reminder
learning, which may either recruit the original stable
memory about the learned stimulus and bring it
back into an unstable form (trace dominance
hypothesis, see discussion below), or it initiates a
new learning trial based on the fact that a learned
stimulus also activates the reward system and thus
initiates new learning (internal reinforcement
hypothesis, see below). Both extinction and remin-
der learning are followed by their respective
consolidation processes: consolidation of an
extinction memory and reconsolidation of the
reminder memory. Studies in the crab
Chasmaganathus (Pedreira and Maldonado, 2003)
and the honeybee (Stollhoff et al., 2005) showed
that the strength of these two consolidation pro-
cesses depends on both the strength of the
reminder memory and the strength or number of
extinction trials. These observations resemble find-
ings in vertebrates showing that the presentation of
an extinction trial does not always result in extinc-
tion alone, rather it may lead to an opposing
behavioral phenomenon, the stabilization of the
response learned earlier. In this case, the extinction
trial transfers the old memory from an inactive,
stable protein synthesis-independent memory into
an active and unstable protein synthesis-dependent
reminder memory (Nader, 2003; Dudai and
Eisenberg, 2004). In the honeybee, the balance
between the extinction and reminder learning pro-
cesses and their respective consolidation processes
depends on the number of extinction trials.
Extinction learning is dominant after two extinction
trials, whereas reminder learning is expressed in a
recovery from extinction and is induced by many
(five) extinction trials. Consolidation of reminder
learning (reconsolidation) depends on protein
synthesis, which indicates that a new learning pro-
cess is going on, as shown in the vertebrate studies.
Nader (2003) and Dudai (2004) proposed the
hypothesis of ‘‘trace dominance’’ and interpret the
results as a competition between consolidation of
extinction memory and reconsolidation of reminder
memory ‘‘with the dominant one being the one most
affected by protein synthesis inhibition.’’ This
hypothesis can explain the observations on aversive
learning in the crab Chasmaganathus (Pedreira and
Maldonado, 2003) but not those on appetitive
learning in the honeybee (Stollhoff et al., 2005). In
Chasmaganathus extinction memory and its conso-
lidation are dominant after either one strong or
many extinction trials, whereas a weak or only one
extinction trial leads to dominance of reminder
learning and of its corresponding reconsolidation.
Exactly the opposite was found in bees. One reason
might be a difference between consolidation pro-
cesses induced by aversive or appetitive learning.
Furthermore, the trace dominance hypothesis pro-
poses that either the reconsolidation of the reminder
memory or the consolidation of the extinction mem-
ory occurs according to an ‘all-or-none’ rule. The
bee data do not support such a conclusion, because
inhibiting consolidation of extinction memory
results in an opposite behavioral effect than the
inhibition of reconsolidation of reminder memory.
It was hypothesized that in bees these consolidation
Cognition in Invertebrates 423
processes take place in parallel, rather than follow-
ing an ‘all-or-none’ rule (Stollhoff et al., 2005).
The results on reconsolidation in the honeybee
can be explained via properties of the reward system
in the bee brain. Hammer (1993) found that the
reward neuron VUMmx1 not only codes for appeti-
tive reinforcement of odors, but also learns to
respond to the conditioned odor stimulus, and an
extinction trial does indeed activate the VUM neu-
ron (Hammer, 1997). This means that an extinction
trial will lead to new appetitive learning without an
external reinforcing stimulus. This is exactly what
was found: two forms of learning, one based on the
lack of external reinforcement (extinction learning),
and one based on the internal existence of reinforce-
ment (reminder learning). These conditions are best
captured by the ‘internal reinforcement hypothesis’,
which states that the balance between extinction
and reminder learning depends on the relative
strength of the internal reinforcement. The balance
will be shifted to the internal reinforcement with
more unrewarded presentations of the learned
stimulus.
1.26.6.4 Ecology of Memory Systems
From an evolutionary point of view one may expect
that memory dynamics are adapted to choice beha-
vior under natural conditions. Foraging in
pollinating insects is a behavior with a highly reg-
ular sequential structure of events ranging from
actions within seconds to those separated by months
and thus may offer the opportunity to relate mem-
ory structure and ecological demands (Menzel,
1999). Different memories are consulted during
the sequence of events during foraging. In the bee,
the time courses of successive behaviors during fora-
ging match the temporal dynamics of memory
stages. Choices between flowers within the same
patch quickly succeed each other and are performed
during eSTM. Choices between flowers of different
patches occur after the transition to lSTM.
Successive bouts are interrupted by the return to
the hive such that flower choices in a subsequent
bout require retrieving information from MTM.
The separation between the two forms of LTM
may be related to the periods when flower patches
are in bloom (Menzel, 2001).
Although these ecological considerations are
highly speculative, they indicate, on the one hand,
that sequences of natural behavior need to be exam-
ined with respect to the intrinsic properties of the
neural machinery underlying memory formation.
On the other hand, they emphasize the necessity of
considering the results of laboratory studies on
memory formation in the context of natural beha-
vior. Only comparative studies will help us discern
which properties reflect general mechanisms and
which indicate species-specific adaptations, and
invertebrates offer a huge range of ecological adap-
tations. This conclusion supports the fact that more
studies on the natural behavior of animal models of
memory are necessary. To which extent do the dif-
ferent memory phases of Drosophila or Aplysia
correlate with specific sequences of their behavior?
To which extent are aversive and appetitive mem-
ories coincident with respect to their dynamics,
given the fact that they respond to different natural
sequences and behavioral timing? These questions
require comparative studies of memory that allow
for the natural context in which memory is to be
employed, a requirement that is seldom met by stu-
dies on invertebrate memory.




One of the most important steps in conceptualizing
cognition is the distinction between implicit and
explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge may – in a
strict sense – exist only in humans. Animals (other
than primates) might possess only implicit knowl-
edge, but this does not rule out the possibility that
certain forms of knowledge might reach an ‘explicit-
like’ status specific for the animal species in question
in the sense that internal operations on memories (or
representations) are performed without motor
expression of such operations. A telling example of
this form of knowledge is the choice behavior of
food-storing birds which makes their choices depen-
dent on what kind of food they have stored and
when and where they have stored it (Clayton et al.,
2003b). Thus, expectation, attention, planning, and
decision making could be useful terms for animals,
even if we assume that they possess only implicit
knowledge. If such terms are used, we assume that
the animal retrieves a memory whose structure
allows two or more alternative outcomes to be eval-
uated before any motor action is performed. We
shall address the question here whether it is reason-
able to assume such forms of internal processing in
invertebrates, in particular, in insects (e.g., the hon-
eybee) and cephalopods (octopus) (for Drosophila
see Greenspan and van Swinderen, 2004). Do these
animals have a memory in the sense that its contents
can be recollected outside of the immediate sensory–
motor control, and used for internal operations?
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There are good reasons for rejecting this kind of
questioning when it comes to understanding inver-
tebrate behavior. Too often, mentalistic reasoning
has led to obscure arguments and untestable
hypotheses. On the other hand, searching for experi-
mental conditions that would allow us to address
the internal processing of the brain devoid of sen-
sory–motor control, its spontaneity and creativity,
in even such a tiny brain as that of insects, may help
to do better justice to the complexity of neural func-
tions in bigger brains. In most behavioral studies,
inference about internal processing can be made
only indirectly by observing changes in behavior.
In the honeybee, one can study a communicative
process between foraging animals transcending the
usual limitations of behavioral studies in inverte-
brates, and ‘read’ their reports on what they
perceived, what they learned, and what they con-
sider to be worth reporting. This unique situation
was ingeniously exploited by von Frisch (1967),
who discovered through it a whole range of sensory
capacities and experience-dependent faculties. More
recently, work on honeybees has benefited from
cognitive perspectives (Menzel and Giurfa, 2001;
Giurfa, 2003), and it is on this aspect that we
focus in this article.
The topics of observatory learning, navigation
and communication are addressed here because it
is under these conditions that learning transcends
elementary forms of association in particularly
clear ways. The evaluating signal for storing
experience must come from internal nervous sys-
tem conditions at the time of learning, depends
considerably on the motivational level, requires
attention to a subset of stimuli, and is adjusted
to the animal’s own behavior in an intricate way.
The signals learned are usually composed of mul-
timodal inputs which cannot be isolated from
each other, and the motor performances involve
sophisticated sequences of motor programs. As
will be seen, it is still very difficult to prove the
cognitive nature of the processes, because more
elementary interpretations need to be carefully
considered. Close sensory–motor connections, sim-
ple partial matching strategies between
experienced and remembered constellations,
sequences of picture memories, and other forms
of elementary solutions to complex conditions
must be discarded before elaborating on an ani-
mal’s cognitive sophistication.
1.26.7.1 Observatory Learning
Observatory learning differs from associative learn-
ing in the lack of an obvious external reinforcing
stimulus. Thus, an animal capable of observatory
learning should be able to internally evaluate envir-
onmental conditions as well as its own actions by
activating a circuit that informs it about the value of
signals and actions to which the animal is simply
exposed.
The cephalopod mollusk Octopus vulgaris is able
to learn a visual discrimination by observing the
behavior of conspecifics (Fiorito and Scotto, 1992;
Fiorito and Chichery, 1995; Fiorito et al., 1998). In
the experiment, one group of animals (demonstra-
tors) was first trained to attack one of two
simultaneously presented colored balls. When the
animal attacked the correct ball, it was rewarded
with food which was attached to the opposite side of
the ball. If the animal chose the wrong ball, it was
punished with an electric shock. In a second phase,
untrained octopuses (observers) watched demon-
strators attack that stimulus from an adjacent
tank. No contingent reward or punishment was
given to the demonstrator during this observation
period. In the final phase, the observers were
exposed to the two balls. In over 80% of all cases,
they only attacked the ball of the same color as that
attacked by the demonstrator. Untrained animals do
not exhibit such a strong preference. This vicar-
iously acquired discriminatory behavior is stable
for at least 5 days after the observational phase.
The salticid jumping spider of the genus Portia
was exposed to a three-dimensional maze which the
animal could oversee in its entirety (Tarsitano and
Jackson, 1997). One of the two wire paths led to a
food lure, the other did not. After visually scanning
the entire track, at the first trial the animal already
made 75% correct choices at that vantage point.
This remarkable display of problem solving requires
planning and expectation, performed by a brain of
only several hundred micrometers in diameter.
Honeybees in a swarm searching for a new nest
site inspect potential locations by running in various
directions along the walls of the cavity and perform-
ing recruitment dances at the surface of the swarm
according to the suitability of the cavity as a nest site
(its size, humidity, proximity, and possibly other
parameters (Seeley, 1977)). The kind of individual
learning during these behaviors can only be
addressed as observatory learning, because no
reward is provided to the animal inspecting a cavity.
The search is focused exclusively on potential nest
sites: the animal has to integrate a large range of
sensory inputs which are accessible only by its own
exploratory behavior, and must evaluate them
according to an innate template, which cannot be
totally fixed, because otherwise a bee would never
find a suitable new nest site. Many more such forms
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of observatory learning exist in insects, crustaceans,
and cephalopods, but only few have been studied
carefully, because natural conditions are required
for the animal to initiate its exploratory behavior,
and it is often difficult to evaluate the learning dur-
ing observation.
1.26.7.2 Navigation
Navigation is an orientation strategy that allows
animals to travel between defined locations without
having direct sensory access to these locations. In
this sense navigation differs from general orienta-
tion and guidance, which include all forms of spatial
relationships between the animals’ body positions
and trajectories of movement relative to sensory
conditions. Navigation allows animals to travel
over rather long distances relative to their body
size and sensory range, according to their knowl-
edge of the structure of their surroundings, which
they acquire by sequential experience. Several clas-
sifications of navigation have been proposed,
reflecting different conceptual frameworks, for
example, route and local navigation (O’Keefe and
Nadel, 1978), cognitive mapping, piloting and dead
reckoning (Gallistel, 1990), egocentric and allo-
centric navigation (Wehner, 1992; Thinus-Blanc,
1987), random navigation, taxon navigation, praxis
navigation, route navigation and local navigation,
graph and map navigation (Gillner and Mallot,
1998). Irrespective of whether the classification
focuses on sensory, neural, or mental processes, or
whether the structure of the external signals was
referred to, two basic navigation strategies emerge
from these various viewpoints: route strategy (also
called graph structure of navigation; Gillner and
Mallot, 1998) and local navigation or map strategy
(also called cognitive mapping; Tolman, 1948;
Gallistel, 1990; Pastergue-Ruiz et al., 1995).
Besides these strict definitions, the term navigation
is often used in loose terms, for example, when
C. elegans explores its environment, and genes are
characterized that control elements of this explora-
tory behavior in different ways (Gray et al., 2005;
Rodger et al., 2004), or when Drosophila runs
between two or more visual marks in a rather
stereotypic way (Go¨tz, 1975). It is an interesting
but yet unresolved question whether genes identified
by testing these very simple forms of movement may
also be involved in controlling the ontogenetic setup
and switching the circuits that underlie navigation
in the strict sense. A hint in this direction comes
from the observation that the foraging gene (Engel
et al., 2000) involved in exploratory behavior in
Drosophila larvae appears to be more strongly
expressed when honeybees switch to foraging beha-
vior (Ben Shahar et al., 2002).
Place learning in a small environment like the
Morris water tank provides a useful paradigm for
studying components of navigation in small mam-
mals like rats, and their neuronal underpinnings
(Morris, 1982). A similar attempt has been followed
for the cockroach by providing a cool place on a hot
platform (Mizunami et al., 1998). In such a para-
digm, called ‘the Tennessee Williams paradigm’ for
obvious literary reasons, a cockroach learns to
choose the cooler place using the spatial relation-
ships between landmarks in the environment,
though in a less robust way than rodents. In addi-
tion, it was found that bilateral lesions in the MB
region reduce place learning. Coincidently, crickets
may learn to use responses to olfactory stimuli at
two different contexts (Matsumoto and Mizunami,
2004), or to combine visual and olfactory cues in
choosing a particular exit hole among several iden-
tical holes in order to escape from a circular arena
(Scotto-Lomassese et al., 2003). MB neurogenesis
seems to be crucial for the last task, since irradiating
the dividing neuroblasts around this structure sup-
presses this ability.
In studies with rodents, an essential aspect relates
to the distinction between navigation according to
landmarks (true ‘spatial-based’ navigation), a hip-
pocampus-dependent form of behavior, and ‘cue-
based’ navigation, a behavior which in mammals is
independent of the hippocampus (Morris, 1982). It
is not yet known whether structures of the arthro-
pod brain are differentially involved in these two
paradigmatically different forms of navigation, and
in particular whether the MB in the insect brain may
be a structure necessary for relational, landmark-
based navigation. However, a comparison between
studies of the cockroach (Mizunami et al., 1998),
and the cricket (Scotto-Lomassese et al., 2003) may
provide an insight into these questions, because the
cockroach study would reflect a case of spatial-
based navigation, since the safe place in the arena
had to be found on the basis of spatial relationships
between external landmarks. The cricket study, on
the other hand, could be considered as a case of cue-
based navigation, because the correct and the wrong
exit holes were marked by nonambiguous cues.
Interestingly, the same structure, the MBs, was cru-
cial for both kind of performances, although in the
case of crickets it was the formation of new
MB-constitutive neurons that was affected, and
not the MB circuit itself, as in the cockroach study
(Mizunami et al., 1998).
Below we focus on navigation in social
Hymenoptera, because the relationship between
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route strategy and map strategy has been the subject
of intensive and controversial debates in these
insects. Traditional thinking about navigation in
insects was based on the notion that a toolbox of
rather simple sensory–motor routines is at the ani-
mal’s disposal and their stepwise application may
lead to the solution of isolated, rather independent
navigational tasks. These robot-like concepts were
developed by experiments based on the analysis of
route learning, sometimes even at such a small scale
that target-related orientation – rather than naviga-
tion – was tested (Collett and Collett, 2002). Bees
and ants traveling between their nest and a food
source learn the vector components of their move-
ments (direction and distance) by a dead reckoning
(path integration) process (Wehner, 1992).
Landmarks experienced en route may serve to cali-
brate measured distances (Srinivasan et al., 2000a),
thus reducing the rotatory and translatory errors
that may accumulate during path integration
(Wehner et al., 1996; Graham and Collett, 2002).
Furthermore landmarks may provide procedural
information about turns to make and distances to
travel next (Collett, 1996, 1998; Collett and Collett,
2000; Kohler and Wehner, 2005) such that
apparently complex performances could be based
on simple rules of learning sensory–motor connec-
tions. Honeybees can, for instance, learn to
negotiate complex mazes of adjacent boxes by asso-
ciating colored disks with right or left turns (Zhang
et al., 2000; Srinivasan and Zhang, 2004). Since
bees are able to refer to a compass direction even
when the sun is not available (e.g., under an overcast
sky and as measured by their dance performance;
von Frisch, 1967; Dyer and Gould, 1981), land-
marks also serve as compass-related directional
cues that could be understood as a backup system,
but it could also mean that landmarks are incorpo-
rated into a geostable map-like memory of the
experienced environment (see discussion below).
The redundancy of landmarks is thought to be
reduced by reference to contextual information
such as the visual panorama (Collett et al., 2002;
Kohler and Wehner, 2005). Consequently, ‘isolated’
landmarks may not be sufficient for successful navi-
gation, or their information might be suppressed
under competition conditions, as often occurs in
experiments where bees are transported to an unex-
pected release site. The animal may then shift its
reference to salient signals like farther-ranging land-
marks. Furthermore, a dissociation of behavior may
occur that seems to indicate the combined action of
separate navigational cues. For example, bees flying
in a narrow tunnel search at the correct distance if
both local and contextual cues are available. If one
of the two cues is shifted or removed, then the con-
textual cue appears to be the more important one
(Collett et al., 2002). Under more natural condi-
tions, a dissociation of two forms of distance
estimation, odometry by the visual flow field (Esch
et al., 2001; Srinivasan et al., 2000b) and landmark
sequences, can be found. Chittka and Geiger (1995)
set up an experiment in which sequentially experi-
enced landmarks guided free-flying bees over
hundreds of meters to a feeding station. The bees
searched both at the absolute distance as measured
by odometry and at the location designated by the
sequence of landmarks. The directional component
of flight is also controlled by landmarks (Collett,
1996), and even novel directions can be traveled if
a particular landmark constellation simultaneously
triggers the retrieval of memories for two different
flight directions (Menzel et al., 1998).
Training bees along a route will establish a parti-
cular spatial memory structure, and very different
forms of spatial memory may result from explora-
tory orientation flights that bees perform before
beginning their foraging life (von Frisch, 1967;
Capaldi et al., 2000). Indeed, it was found that
bees lacking route training were able to return to
the nest from sites all around the hive, located sev-
eral hundred meters away (Menzel et al., 2000), a
range over which orientation flights are performed
(Capaldi et al., 2000). Comparing such bees with
those trained along a route showed that the working
memory of the route dominated initial navigation,
leading the animals in the wrong direction and first
suppressing the memory that later quickly leads the
animals back to their goal (the hive). Since only the
initial flight path was monitored in these experi-
ments, and vanishing bearings were taken as
measures of navigation, inadequate concepts were
derived because the multitude of spatial memories
was not considered (Wehner and Menzel, 1990;
Dyer, 1991; Wehner, 1992).
Most of the experiments on the role of landmarks
on path integration, compass-driven sequential pic-
torial learning, and the relationship between
‘isolated’ landmarks and contextual landmarks
were carried out in miniature environments which
forced bees to fly through narrow entrances into
small boxes or mazes (Collett and Collett, 2002).
All these tests made forced route training necessary,
avoided testing the sequential experience of natural
landmarks in unhindered flight, and did not expose
the bees to the temporal and spatial structures they
would normally experience in free flight. Certainly,
such experiments have the advantage of observing
the bee over the full flight close to the goal, but the
limitations for generalization to natural conditions
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are obvious, since they reflect only the approaching
components and orientation strategies that bees
may adopt when close to the goal. Navigation in
the real bee flight range (several kilometers) must be
guided by compass-related learning of multiple
sequences of landmarks that are visible under differ-
ent perspectives and over different ranges of the
flight path, some of which are only visible when
the bees get close to them. The essence of the navi-
gational problem – whether an animal is able to
orient itself and infer a direction of movement
along a novel path aiming toward another location
that is not directly accessible – cannot be addressed
by such reduced experimental setups. Questions
that are not asked in an experiment cannot be
answered by it. Working under natural conditions,
however, limits the possibility of untangling the
relevant parameters underlying navigation strate-
gies. Therefore, such ‘naturalistic’ experiments
have a different quality. They are necessarily more
descriptive and less analytical, but they provide
clues for behavioral capacities while allowing a
rather limited mechanistic interpretation. Recently,
a method based on harmonic radar detection of free-
flying bees was applied that allows researchers to
observe a bee when it travels over natural distances
(see below).
By far most of the experiments on insect naviga-
tion were carried out with ants (the wood ant
Formica rufa, the desert ant Cataglyphis, the
Australian desert ant Melophorus bagoti) and the
honeybee. The data were often used to transfer
the concepts developed for ants to bees (and even
to arthropods in general; Wehner, 1992), implying
that navigation strategies are similar in running and
in flying insects. Bees fly over distances of a few
kilometers, cruising well above ground, with a
bird’s-eye view; ants run a few tens of meters. It
would be rather strange if the navigation systems
of running and flying insects, in particular their
‘cognitive’ (integrative) levels, were similar.
Experiments addressing distance estimation in ants
and bees clearly show, for instance, that these two
insects differ dramatically in their manners of esti-
mating distance. While bees seem to use the optic
flow field (the relative displacement of the visual
field on the insect retina) experienced en route to
the goal, ants do not seem to rely on optic flow
to the same extent (Ronacher et al., 2000).
Recently it was shown that ants can estimate
the distance to travel within a tunnel in the dark
without any kind of visual information (Thielin-
Bescond and Beugnon, 2005), thus underlying the
role of proprioceptive cues for distance estimation
in ants.
1.26.7.2.1 The map concept and its experimental
support Local navigation or map-based strategy
allows goal-directed decisions at any place and
toward any intended location in the experienced
area, thus resulting in a transfer between routes
and inference of novel routes. Such a strategy has
until recently not been convincingly documented for
insects, and is the subject of lively debate (Giurfa
and Capaldi, 1999; Collett and Collett, 2002).
Navigational memories that are more flexible than
route memories are found in experiments that
avoided route training in bees and proved that bees
are able to return to the hive from any place around
the hive within a rather short time (Menzel et al.,
2000). It was concluded that bees learn features of
the landscape during their orientation flights
(Capaldi et al., 2000) and establish a special ‘land-
scape memory’ that relates landmarks to the bees’
central place, the hive. It was only recently that the
structure of this ‘landscape memory’ could be criti-
cally tested using harmonic radar technology to
track individual bees (Menzel et al., 2005). In this
study, three test groups were studied and their flight
paths recorded after they were released at many
different release sites around the hive. The three
test groups were: bees that were trained to a feeder
placed at variable locations in close vicinity to the
hive that was moved around the hive at a constant
distance (VF bees) and that therefore did not
develop a route memory; bees that were trained to
a stationary feeder 200 m to the east of the hive (SF
bees) and thus developed a route memory; and bees
that were recruited by foragers that collected food at
the stationary feeder (R bees). It was found that all
bees returned to the hive along fast and straight
flights from all regions around the hive. SF and R
bees did so after they had performed the vector
(distance and direction) components of their trained
or instructed route flights; VF bees returned after
searching for a while. Most importantly, SF bees
performed either direct flights back to the hive or
via the feeder to the hive.
Several operations must be at the animal’s dispo-
sal: (1) recalling memories of these vectors
(segments with defined headings and distances)
pointing toward the hive with a large number of
landmarks all around the hive that are recognized
from different viewpoints, (2) a shift in motivation
(fly toward the hive or toward the feeder), (3) refer-
ence to the outbound vector components of the route
flight from hive to feeder, and (4) addition and sub-
traction of the flight vectors for at least two sets of
vector memories; those which would lead directly
back to the hive, and those that lead from the hive
to the feeder. It is difficult to imagine that these
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operations can be done without reference to vectors
that relate locations to each other, and thus make up
a map. The question now in bee navigation is not so
much whether there is a map-like spatial memory,
but rather ‘What structure does this map-like mem-
ory have and how is it used?’. In any case, the map-
like memory in bees is rich and can be used in a
flexible way. Any model of bee navigation thus has
to incorporate a strategy based on a map-like repre-
sentation of the bees’ large-scale home range and a
freedom to choose between at least two goals. This
further suggests that spatial relations between envir-
onmental features appear to be coherently
represented in a map-like memory in insects as they
are in other animals and humans (Gallistel, 1990;
Shelton and McNamara, 1997; Klatzky, 1998).
Parsimony is a strong argument in the interpreta-
tion of experimental data, and has been applied
rather strictly in studies of insect navigation
(Wehner, 1992). However, it should not be over-
looked that radical forms of parsimony as applied to
behavioral science were (and may still, at least par-
tially be), a historical burden. New approaches were
required to correct for eliminating the brain in beha-
viorism and making too simple assumptions about
the brain’s functions in ethology. These cognitive
approaches (cognitive ethology, psychology, neu-
roscience) provide us with novel avenues to brain
function (Kandel and Squire, 1992). A frequently
used argument in navigation studies, which states
that reference to cognitive processing (a cognitive or
mental map) must be avoided as long as ‘simpler’
explanations are at hand (Bennett, 1996), may warn
us about potential traps, but should not be accepted
as a ban. Furthermore, it is argued (Collett and
Collett, 2002) that small brains, like that of the
bee, need to solve their tasks with less ‘cognition’,
meaning with a toolbox of loosely interrelated ele-
mentary functions rather than an integrated,
allocentric level of spatial representation (see discus-
sion above). It should be recognized that we simply
do not know whether the integration of the multiple
and complex sensory and procedural neural
processes into a common spatial memory with
geometric organization (a map) may not be a
more economical and thus simpler way of represent-
ing sequential experiences during navigation
(Griffin, 1984).
1.26.7.3 Communication
All sensory channels (besides magnetic sense) are used
in invertebrates for communication, and elaborate
sender–receiver systems have evolved for intersex
communication, predator–prey relationships, and
social interactions. Communication by pheromones
has been addressed above (see Section 1.26.2).
Optical signals include light emission by luminance
organs in night-dwelling invertebrates ranging from
unicellular organisms to crustaceans and insects (Lall,
1993; Buck and Case, 2002). Sex-specific coloration
and movement patterns of body appendages or of the
whole animal are often used to attract the other sex,
and specific photoreceptors or visual interneurons
have evolved (e.g., the flight maneuvers and the
‘love spot’ in diptera; Hornstein et al., 2000;
Egelhaaf and Kern, 2002). Airborne sound and sub-
strate vibration are most important signals for all
three behavioral conditions of communication
(intersex, predator–prey, social interactions; Cocroft
and Rodriguez, 2005). Although the sensory, ecolo-
gical, and evolutionary aspects of these
communication systems have been often studied in
great detail in invertebrates (e.g., sound communica-
tion in insects: Henry (1994), Gerhardt and Huber
(2002); substrate vibration in spiders: Barth (2002),
and in insects: Ho¨lldobler and Roces (2000), Cocroft
(2003); visual signaling in butterflies: Eisner and
Aneshansley (1973); chemical signaling: (Ho¨lldobler
and Wilson (1990), Eisner and Meinwald (1995); see
also Section 1.26.2), very little is known about the
cognitive dimensions of these communication sys-
tems, for example, how the innate mechanisms
interact with experience-dependent developmental
processes, how the innate mechanisms are related to
internal and external context conditions, whether
learning shapes the communication process, and if
communication leads to individual recognition (see
discussion below). More is known in these respects
about the ritualized movements (‘waggle dance’) used
by honeybees to communicate distance and direction
from the hive or the swarm to important places
(potential nest sites, feeding, water or resin places).
We therefore consider this form of communication in
more detail.
1.26.7.3.1 The cognitive dimensions of dance com-
munication in honeybees In the waggle dance, a
dancing bee (Apis mellifera) executes fast and short
forward movements straight ahead on the comb
surface, returns in a semicircle in the opposite direc-
tion, and starts the cycle again in regular alternation
(each waggle dance involves several of these cycles;
von Frisch, 1967). The straight portion of this
course, called a waggle-run, consists of a single
stride (Tautz et al., 1996) emphasized by lateral
waggling motions of the abdomen. The length of
the single waggle-runs increases with the distance
flown to reach the source, and their angles relative
to gravity correlate with the direction of the
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foraging flights relative to the sun’s azimuth in the
field and sun-linked patterns of polarized skylight.
Thus, by encoding the visually measured distance
(Esch and Burns, 1995; Srinivasan et al., 2000a;
Tautz et al., 2004) and the direction toward the
goal, the waggle dance allows colony members to
share information about the distance and direction
toward a desirable goal (von Frisch, 1967; Seeley,
1995; Dyer, 2002). Although Karl von Frisch used
the term ‘‘dance language,’’ Premack and Premack
(1983) correctly stated that the honeybee dances
should not be called a language, based on the argu-
ment that there is no evidence that the bees can
judge whether their dances conform to anything in
their surroundings. This question can be addressed
by asking whether a bee receiving information from
the dance responds differently to the information
depending on its own experience. Such experiments
have yet to be performed. There is also no evidence
yet that honeybees employ chain communication
whereby an animal picks up on the received infor-
mation without experiencing itself the primary
signals inducing the dance. In his studies of dance
communication within a swarm, Lindauer (1955)
did not observe a bee changing its dance pattern
until it had actually visited the second cavity, and
these observations were verified more recently by
Visscher and Camazine (1999), who observed no
higher attraction of bees to dances which indicated
the same location as the one for which they had
previously been dancing. The authors also found
that it takes a swarm longer to get started with the
flight to a new nest site if the decision must be made
between alternative nest sites, and they present
arguments for some form of collective ‘‘quorum
sensing’’ (Seeley and Visscher, 2004; see also
below). Furthermore, the term ‘‘language’’ is also
misleading, because there is (as far as we know) no
semantics or grammar in the ritualized movements
of the dance. ‘‘Indexical’’ or ‘‘iconic’’ (Bermudez,
2003) would be better descriptive terms to charac-
terize the informational status of the dance.
Since navigating bees benefit from path integra-
tion (Wehner and Menzel, 1990; Dyer, 1998;
Collett and Collett, 2002; Wehner, 2003), vector
memories derived from recent flight paths might be
recalled in the dance context. Indeed, path integra-
tion (which requires working memory in order to
continuously record the angular and linear compo-
nents of the animal’s movements) provides ants and
most likely also bees with ‘global’ vectors at the ends
of their outbound paths, which allow them to follow
straight trajectories of the appropriate distance and
direction during their inbound path. Although the
global vector is emptied each time the animal
returns to the nest, desert ants can store a short-
lived 180-reversed form of a recently experienced
homing path, and use it to guide their outbound
paths toward previously visited locations (Wehner,
1992). Moreover, when trained bees arriving at a
foraging target are held captive for several hours,
they subsequently fly farther outward away from
the hive along the same hive-target direction (Dyer
et al., 2002). We may therefore assume that forager
bees also store a form of global vector that they later
recall in the context of the waggle dance. But does
the waggle dance encode a global vector, an inte-
grated form of the measures of distance and
direction, and/or even code for a location?
Early detour experiments by von Frisch and col-
leagues (reviewed in von Frisch, 1967) indicated
that the bees’ visually driven odometer is primarily
decoupled from the processing of directional infor-
mation, indicating that no global flight vector is
reported in the context of the waggle dance. When
bees are compelled to fly a two-legged detour path
to reach the goal, their dances indicate the direction
of the straight line toward the goal (computed from
the two legs of the detour), even when they followed
the detour on the way back to the colony; but they
signal the distances actually flown, and not the dis-
tance of the straight segment connecting the target
and the hive’s entrance. These early findings were
recently confirmed by manipulating the naviga-
tional information provided to a dancing bee (De
Marco and Menzel, 2005). Thus, one might ask
whether the waggle dance encodes spatial informa-
tion provided only by the actual flight path. The role
of landmarks so far has been considered only in the
context of resetting (Srinivasan et al., 2000b) or
calibrating the odometer (Tautz et al., 2004) but
not in the communicative process. The detour
experiments by von Frisch suggest that the direc-
tional component reported in the waggle dance
may also be derived from stored path integration
coordinates of visually defined locations (land-
marks). This idea is not without precursors. Early
experiments showed that with increasing experience
of the terrain, directional information available dur-
ing the inbound flight may be computed for the
purpose of directional indication in the waggle
dance (Otto, 1959). If the waggle dance computes
directional information which depends not only
on the current state of the animal’s path integrator,
but also on information that the animal has
associated with landmark views, that is, local vec-
tors associated with landmarks (Etienne et al.,
2004), navigating bees would rely not only on an
egocentric, but also on a geocentric system of
reference.
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It has been argued in the section on navigation
(see Section 1.26.7.3) that the navigational strate-
gies applied by foraging bees cannot be fully
appreciated if one assumes a hive-centered ego-
centric form of spatial memory. Instead, it seems
that the orientation flights of young or reorienting
bees lead to a map-like spatial memory that appears
to be derived from repetitive exposure to the same
landmarks from different viewpoints. Given this
capacity and the fact that bees are recruited by a
dancing bee only after they performed their orienta-
tion flights, it is tempting to assume that bees
attending a dance might recall from its memory of
landmarks and homing vectors a corresponding out-
bound vector that is related to expected landmarks.
Under these conditions neither the dance behavior
nor the flight path of a recruited bee would be
guided solely by two independent measures (direc-
tion and distance) but rather by an ‘expectation’ to
arrive at a particular location. A component of this
‘expectation’ would be the route to be followed, as
embedded in the map-like memory including
sequences of landmarks. Indeed, already von Frisch
(1968) stated that the effectiveness of waggle dances
(in terms of successful recruitment) depends upon
the foraging experience of the dance followers.
When two groups of fellow bees have visited two
different (and currently exhausted) unscented feed-
ing places, contact with a dancer indicating the
accustomed goal is much more effective than con-
tact with a dancer indicating the unfamiliar one. In
spite of these early findings, however, the role of
stored navigational information on the decoding
process involved in the waggle dance remains
entirely unknown.
1.26.7.4 Individual Recognition
Cricket males perform rivalry songs, defend their
territories, and fight against each other (Alexander,
1961; Adamo and Hoy, 1995); however, no clear
evidence exists yet that winners and losers learn to
recognize each other on an individual basis (Paul
Stevenson, personal communication). The yellow–
black patterns of the faces and the abdomen of the
paper wasp Polistes fuscatus vary considerably,
making it possible that individual animals in these
small colonies might recognize each other (Tibbetts,
2002). More variable patterns with larger black
components were found to be carried by individuals
ranking higher in the nest hierarchy. Altering these
facial and/or abdominal color patterns induces
aggression against such animals, irrespective of
whether their patterns were made to signal higher
or lower ranking, and arguments – though not fully
conclusive – have been provided stating that this
altered aggressiveness may indicate individual
recognition (Tibbetts and Dale, 2004). Although
this study appears to indicate the first case of indi-
vidual recognition in insects, it is rather likely (but
not yet proven) that other invertebrates, in particu-
lar territorial cephalopods like octopus, should
recognize each other on an individual basis.
An additional but in no way necessary component
of individual recognition is ‘self-recognition’, the dis-
crimination between signals from the animal’s own
body from those from the outside world. Do inverte-
brates experience ‘pain’, a form of self-recognition
that includes an emotional and a warning component
that points to the future? Locusts and crabs cast off
body appendages when attacked. Do they experience
different forms of sensory input when they perform
these actions themselves or when the same appen-
dages are removed? When honeybees lose their
stinger the abdomen is damaged so much that the
animal will die. It has been observed that alarm
pheromone, which usually triggers an attack flight,
induces stress analgesia via an opioid system in the
honeybee (Nunez et al., 1997), potentially indicating
that a preparatory response of the nervous system
leads to a reduction of the strong sensory input
from the body distraction. Opioids, which are usually
associated with stress-induced analgesia, have been
found in other invertebrates such as crickets (Jaffe
and Blanco, 1994) and the praying mantis (Zabala
et al., 1984), thus suggesting that their presence may
serve to counteract the effect of nociceptive stimuli as
in vertebrates.
E. O. Wilson states on the final page of The Insect
Societies:
The insect societies are, for the most part, impersonal. The
small, relatively primitive colonies of bumblebees and Polistes
wasps are based on dominance hierarchies, and individuals
appear to recognize one another to a limited extent. In other
kinds of social insects, however, personalized relationships
play little or no role. The sheer size of the colonies and the
short life of the members make it inefficient, if not impossible,
to establish individual bonds (Wilson, 1971).
As pointed out above (Section 1.26.2), the sheer
unlimited capacity of honeybees to discriminate
odors provides the potential for discrimination of a
very large number of group constellations, even to
the level of individual recognition. Only recently has
it become possible to separately mark all individuals
in a bee colony for automatic detection, and it will
now be possible to track life history, behavior, and
social contacts on an individual basis continuously
over long periods of time.
Sociobiological arguments have been put forward
to argue that due to haplodiploid reproduction in
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hymenopteran societies their members should be
characterized by less individuality, more gene-
related group effects, and some form of individual-
ity of the society (Queller and Strassmann, 2002).
From a cognitive point of view, individuals are
defined by the operations within their nervous sys-
tems, and their experience that this nervous system
belongs to a particular body. As Churchland (2002,
p. 310) points out ‘‘Body-state signals have to be
integrated, options evaluated, and choices made,
since the organism needs to act as a coherent
whole, not as a group of independent systems with
competing interests.’’ Body-state signals are con-
tinuously integrated in members of an insect
society, options are implicitly evaluated as indicated
in the communicative processes, and the individual
organism acts within the society. As in the case of
implicit operations on working memories (represen-
tations), individual recognition within the society
does not require the assumption of any form of
explicit (personal) recognition of oneself and
another member of the society. In this sense, one
may use the modern techniques to search for discri-
mination on the individual level in communication
within insect societies.
1.26.7.5 Collective Cognition
So far, we have concentrated on individual cognitive
capabilities, because learning and memory are prop-
erties which depend on individual experience and
which have to be studied, therefore, at the individual
level. However, individuals of many species live in
societies or form groups, and therefore face pro-
blems that require coordination, task sharing, and
collective decision making. From this perspective, it
is legitimate to ask whether collective behaviors
reflect or even surpass individual plasticity, due,
for instance, to the possible additive effect of indivi-
dual cognitive capacities.
This question has been the subject of debate in
social insects in which colonies were considered
‘superorganisms’ (Seeley, 1989; Southwick, 1983;
Wilson and Sober, 1989). From this point of view,
it has been argued that the ‘superorganism’ protects
and constitutes itself thanks to colony recognition
systems based on cuticular hydrocarbons which are
transferred between individuals within the colony,
thus obscuring, in theory, individual identity
(Queller and Strassmann, 2002). The metaphor of
the ‘superorganism’ may be in a sense misleading,
because an individual, behaving organism is made
from cells and structures tightly interconnected by
complex neuronal, circulatory, and regulatory net-
works, and has a central brain that commands and
produces behavior; the ‘superorganism’, on the
other hand, is made up of individuals which may
be interconnected by complex chemical interactions
but which are rather autonomous and can be hardly
compared to constituent cells. The essential differ-
ence, however, is that although an insect colony
produces collective behavior, it does not have a
central brain to command and control such beha-
vior. On the contrary, studies on collective decision
making in social insects show that collective beha-
vioral patterns can arise without any central
control. How, then, can these patterns of collective
behavior emerge? This question has been intensively
tackled by studies focusing on self-organization
models of collective behavior (Camazine et al.,
2003). Such studies deal with pattern formation
processes in the physical and biological world,
which determine the arising of global order and
structure based on simple interactions between
lower-level components, in this case, individuals
(see above: decision making in a bee swarm).
Such studies have allowed researchers to under-
stand that – despite their potential complexity –
many collective insect behavior patterns emerge
from simple interactions between individuals,
which seem to act on the basis of extremely simple
behavioral rules. For instance, cockroaches and
other insects seeking refuge exhibit complex aggre-
gation phenomena and group distribution between
available shelters. Instead of resulting from indivi-
dual decision making and evaluation and comparison
of each refuge’s characteristics, collective aggregation
results from individual probabilistic rules determin-
ing when to stop walking or when to resume. Factors
like the presence of borders or of a co-specific may
amplify these probabilities like a snowball (i.e., the
larger the cluster, the higher the probability of
attracting even more individuals; see Theraulaz
et al., 2003) but the collective behavioral pattern
emerges without central control or individual com-
parison strategies (Jeanson et al., 2003, 2005).
Similarly, complex architectural structures charac-
terizing ant or termite nests arise without central
control, simply based on a restricted set of indivi-
dual behaviors performed in a rather automatic
way, without ‘knowledge’ of the behavioral patterns
exhibited by other individuals (Buhl et al., 2004).
Ants facing a diamond-shaped bridge with two
branches choose randomly between branches if
both are identical but collectively orient their choice
and select one branch if it has a lateral wall along its
edge. Pharaoh ants walking the wrong way along a
trail are unable to reorient at a trail bifurcation if the
angle is 120, but can if the angle is smaller
(Ratnieks, 2005). Such a collective systematic
432 Cognition in Invertebrates
choice does not result from a sum of individual
evaluations and decisions but from amplification
processes based on physical heterogeneities and che-
mical communication (Dussoutour et al., 2005).
Thus, a preference is set without a clear incidence
of individual decision making and comparison.
Differences in individual thresholds for reacting to
environmental sensory stimuli seem to be a critical
factor for the emergence of collective behaviors
based on task partitioning. Not all individuals
within a group will respond similarly to the same
set of environmental stimuli such that differences in
reaction thresholds may be the basis for behavioral
specializations and thus for the emergence of
sociality.
The conclusion emerging from these studies on
insect collective behavior is that individuals, which
may be viewed as extremely sophisticated at the
cognitive level when performing some individual
tasks, appear as automatons with limited cognitive
capacities when performing collective tasks. This
difference may seem puzzling, because it could be
that cognitive richness is lost or at least temporally
inhibited in a social context. What, for instance,
drives a honeybee scout, which is able to learn
space in the form of a cognitive map (Menzel
et al., 2005) and learns the localization of a poten-
tial nest site and its physical characteristics (Seeley,
1982), to follow dances once, at random, in the
hive, instead of crossing over and comparing dances
for selected sites in the process of nest selection
(Visscher and Camazine, 1999)? In fact, it can be
argued that the question does not actually make
sense from the point of view of the individual insect:
in an individual and in a social context, the animal
will adopt the behavioral strategies leading to adap-
tive solutions either boosting or sacrificing what
researchers would view as cognitive sophistication.
The critical question in this context is therefore
what determines the adoption of one or the other
level of cognitive complexity? Which factors are
responsible for the fact that an ant or a bee that
can learn and memorize several cues while foraging
solve complex discriminations and generate novel
behaviors leading to adaptive solutions, behave
like an automaton following a reduced set of repe-
titive patterns and simple rules in a social context?
Which physiological changes, if any, determine the
passage from one state to the other? Do social reg-
ulation pheromones intervene in the expression or
inhibition of behavioral autonomy in a social con-
text by acting on neurotransmitter levels in the
insect nervous system? So far, we have no answers
to these questions, but they can be approached on an
experimental level. Studying whether or not
individual learning and memory are modified by
exposure to social pheromones or by chemosensory
cues within a group and whether or not biogenic
amine and neurotransmitter levels are changed in
the presence of a group of co-specifics are just
some of the paths that can be followed to provide
some answers to these questions.
1.26.8 Conclusion
The environment poses the same basic demands on
animals with small and with large brains. How do
mates find each other, how much effort, risk,
energy, and time must be invested to find food,
what is the best way for the animal to protect itself
and avoid predators or hazardous conditions, and
how does the animal find its way around are ques-
tions that have to be answered both by vertebrates
and invertebrates in order to survive. It is usually
concluded that invertebrates, with their smaller
brains, apply local solutions to these problems,
that is, solutions that are specific and isolated,
local in a verbal, a mechanistic, and a behavioral
sense. Verbally, a localized solution may mean that
it may suit only a problem at a particular location in
space and time. Mechanistically, local solutions
may mean that only specific sensory–motor connec-
tions in the nervous system may exist with no cross-
talk between them and no common level of memory
storage. Behaviorally, local solutions refer to inde-
pendent behavior routines that are applied without
gaining from each other in different environmental
conditions. In other words, the concept of informa-
tion transfer between sensory–motor routines,
translated in the rise of novel behaviors that allow
responding to novel environmental demands, seems
to be neglected or minimized in the case of
invertebrates.
Our review provides multiple indications as evi-
dence against such an understanding, which ignores
the enormous richness of invertebrate behavior, its
high flexibility, and the cross-talk between different
behavioral routines. Rather, it is appropriate to con-
ceptualize invertebrate behavior from a cognitive
perspective, meaning that small nervous systems
also interconnect the sensory and motor systems,
and install memories not only into specific
sensory–motor circuits but into a common reference
system as well. As a consequence, many invertebrate
species that were studied in this respect were found
to extract rules from particular sequences of experi-
ence and transfer these rules to other sensory
domains. Furthermore, the structure of the memory
established in this way represents the multiple sen-
sory inputs and related behaviors in an integrated
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way such that a representation of complex environ-
mental conditions is formed. Such capacities may
not be surprising when the underlying neural sub-
strate subserving them is explored in detail. As in
larger brains, two basic neural architectural princi-
ples of many invertebrate brains are: the existence of
specialized neuropiles, which refer to specific sen-
sory domains, and higher-order integration centers,
in which information pertaining to these different
domains converges and is integrated, thus allowing
cross-talking and information transfer. In this sense,
both modularity and central integration seem to be
basic building principles adopted by different ner-
vous systems to provide flexible solutions to a
changing environment. Navigation and communi-
cation in social Hymenoptera are particularly
telling examples in this respect, but it is fair to con-
clude that similar integrated forms of dealing with
the environment will be found in other invertebrates
when they are looked at more closely. In this sense,
research addressing behavioral complexity and its
underlying neural substrates is necessary to charac-
terize the real potential of invertebrate learning and
memory. Usually such an approach has been used to
characterize behavioral simplicity rather than com-
plexity. It therefore seems timely to focus on the
latter by studying problem solving besides elemental
forms of learning.
One of the major questions of behavioral biology
in general is also unresolved for invertebrate beha-
vior: the relationship between innate and acquired
behavior. Innate behavior can often be considered
highly integrated in the sense that rather complex
motor performances are adequately expressed in
particular stimulus combinations. The ‘intelligence’
of these integrated systems stems from the specific
activation of such innate behavioral components in
the animal’s motivational conditions and the often
less obvious experience-dependent adaptations. We
have tried to capture these complex interactions
between innate components, motivation, and
acquired memory by coining the terms ‘phylogenetic
memory’ and ‘experience-dependent individual
memory’. Indeed, both forms of stored information
are based on the intimate connectivity of the ner-
vous system, and from the point of view of how
memory is retrieved it may not matter how the
relevant memory has been stored. Rather, it seems
crucial for the organization of memories and the
expression of resulting behaviors how memory is
acquired, that is, to which natural conditions do
memories provide solutions. The intimacy between
phylogenetic and experience-dependent memory is
reflected in the fact that innate and acquired infor-
mation can often not be separated in any given
behavior. Although we have stressed the point that
the richness and flexibility of acquiring information
through experience is the key issue in a cognitive
perspective of invertebrate behavior, it should not
be overlooked that innate components cannot be
considered less cognitive if they are closely con-
nected with flexibility and adaptiveness. To which
extent innate components constitute real limitations
of invertebrate behavior must be analyzed in an
ecological and evolutionary perspective which
takes into account the evolutionary consequences
of innate behaviors. Invertebrates provide us with
an enormous range of solutions to these integrated
forms of dealing with changing environmental con-
ditions and the animal’s needs. Ideally, more studies
on invertebrate behavior will be inspired by this
cognitive perspective.
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